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Objectives: As donor investments in HIV/AIDS decline, transitioning programs to local 
ownership has become a key strategy to enhance the sustainability of donor investments in 
programming implemented in parallel to existing health systems.  Many health systems, however, 
face constraints that may limit the extent to which transitions result in sustainability. This study 
aimed to 1) develop a candidate conceptual model of program sustainability that is consistent 
with transition goals and the process of transitioning ownership, 2) understand the challenges 
associated with transitioning to host-country health systems and potential threats to sustainability, 
and 3) explore the ethical responsibilities of donor agencies relevant to the process of transition. 
Methods: Empirical aims were investigated through a case study of the transition of the Avahan 
Initiative from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to local actors in India.   Key informant 
interviews were conducted and data analysis employed qualitative techniques including 
descriptive coding, pattern coding, and explanation building. The normative aim employed 
standard techniques for investigating responsibilities. 
Results: The candidate model of program sustainability reflects two dimensions: Continuous 
Service Delivery and Maintained Program Quality. These dimensions represent transition 
outcomes achieved when local actors effectively fulfill the responsibilities associated with five 
roles: Leadership, Resource Allocation, Implementation, Strategic Program Management, and 
End-User Engagement.  Challenges associated with program transition to local ownership 
included aligning to a lower costing structure, having more limited flexibility, and adjusting to 
differences in support for community-oriented activities.  These challenges contributed to several 
programmatic changes; limited flexibility to adapt and diminished support for community-
oriented activities were perceived as the greatest threats to long-term sustainability.  Normative 




ensuring that threats to the basic well-being of end-users that have been averted by their programs 
remain averted after exit.    
Conclusions: Transition can sustain program outcomes and constitute a morally responsible exit 
if donors make an effort to understand how their programming averts threats to the basic well-
being of end-users and support capacity-building and advocacy efforts sufficient to ensure that 
local actors are willing and able to effectively avert these threats after transition. 
 
 
Advisor:               Holly Taylor, Ph.D., M.P.H.  
 
Thesis Readers: Sara Bennett, Ph.D.  
Chris Beyrer, M.D., M.P.H. 
Maria Merritt, Ph.D. 
Laura Morlock, Ph.D.   
  
Alternates: Matthew DeCamp, M.D., Ph.D. 






























This work would not have been possible without the support and contributions of many 
individuals whom I have had the pleasure to work with and learn from over the last five years. 
First, the opportunity to engage with Avahan-The India AIDS Initiative was only possible 
with the willingness of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to share their experience and with 
the support of Sara Bennett and the Avahan evaluation team at Johns Hopkins, including Daniela 
Rodriguez, Sachiko Ozawa, Meghan Bohren and Vandana Tripathi.  Their on-going willingness 
to share their experience throughout the evaluation process, support the development of my initial 
proposal, establish contacts in India and at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and provide 
opportunities for continued engagement was invaluable.  
I am grateful for the support of the JHSPH evaluation team as well as colleagues in India 
for support during the data collection phase.  I thank Suneeta Singh, Kriti Singh, and Vibha 
Chhabra for their hospitality in Delhi and their assistance with identifying potentially interested 
participants.  I also thank Krishna Rao and colleagues at the Public Health Foundation of India 
for their willingness to provide me with an institutional “home” and for welcoming me as part of 
their research community while in India.   
I would also like to extend my thanks to all the informants who took time to speak with 
me and to share their perspectives. I have great respect for their work and contributions to the 
success of Avahan and its transition to local ownership.   
I received several forms of financial support to conduct this work. I wish to thank the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation for travel support, as well as the Center for Global Health for a 
Global Health Field Research Award, and the Center for Qualitative Research in Science and 
Medicine for a Dissertation Enhancement Award.  
I am also infinitely grateful to my advisor, Holly Taylor, for her constant commitment to 




program, on through my proposal development and continuing to the very last manuscript draft, 
Holly has always been ready to share her experience, expertise, and enthusiasm.  Her 
encouragement and constructive feedback guided me through the dissertation process, and I am 
thankful to have had such a responsive, thorough, and encouraging mentor.   
 I would also like to recognize those who served on my departmental, school-wide and 
final exam committees for their constructive feedback and suggestions to shape and strengthen 
this project: Stef Baral, Sara Bennett, Chris Beyrer, Matthew DeCamp, Shannon Frattaroli, 
Jeffrey Kahn, Maria Merritt, Laura Morlock, and Daniela Rodriguez, thank you all for your 
contributions. 
On a more personal level, I would like to acknowledge the support of many friends and 
colleagues that have shaped the last five years of my life and made them better by sharing the 
experience of being a PhD student at Hopkins.  Emily, Krista, Cass, Jess, all my fellow students 
in Health Policy & Management, International Health, and throughout the school, thank you for 
making the days more fun, the challenges more surmountable, and the academic process one of 
growth and opportunity.  To my friends outside of Hopkins, thank you for providing balance to 
my academic life and helping me keep “the whole me” in view.   
Finally, I cannot thank enough my parents, brothers, and extended family for their 
unwavering support and continual encouragement.  Mom, Jeff, Casey, Nathan - I feel so 
incredibly lucky to have grown up in your company, and cannot express how grateful I am to 














Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ viii 
List of Acronyms ...................................................................................................................... ix 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 
Paper 1: Program sustainability as a system of roles and responsibilities: A conceptual model 
to bridge the goals of sustainability with the process of transitioning ownership ...... 9 
Paper 2:  Understanding the challenges of program transition and potential threats to 
sustainability: a case study of transitioning a donor-driven program to local 
ownership .................................................................................................................. 42 
Paper 3: A responsible exit: exploring the normative basis of donor agency responsibilities at 
the end of a programming engagement..................................................................... 69 
Appendix A: Methods ........................................................................................................... 100 
Appendix A1: IRB Disclosure Form ..................................................................................... 118 
Appendix A2: Email Recruitment for Subjects Sent from India ........................................... 121 
Appendix A3: Telephone Script ............................................................................................ 122 
Appendix A4: Sample In-Depth Interview Guide ................................................................. 123 





List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Key informant Characteristics…………………………………………………18, 49, 106 















































List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: A Candidate Conceptual Model for Program Sustainability as a System of Roles and  















































List of Acronyms 
 
BMGF Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
CBO Community-based Organization 
FSW Female Sex Worker 
GoI Government of India 
HRG High Risk Group 
IDU Injection Drug User 
MARP Most At-Risk Population 
MSM Men who have Sex with Men 
NACO National AIDS Control Organization 
NACP National AIDS Control Program 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
SACS State AIDS Control Agency 
SLP State Lead Partner 
TG  Transgendered Persons 









This work investigates the conceptual, practical, and ethical issues associated with the 
process of transitioning donor-supported HIV programs implemented through parallel systems to 
local ownership, wherein host-country actors assume responsibilities for sustaining program 
delivery.   
Following the articulation of the Millennium Development Goals, donor support for HIV 
programming increased significantly.
1
  The creation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GFATM) initiated an 
emergency response of dispersing large sums of money quickly. In the early stages of PEPFAR 
this was primarily through separate systems of financial management and service delivery that 
operated in parallel to existing health country systems.
2,3
  While investments in parallel 
programming have contributed to significant gains in HIV control,
4
 donor funding for HIV/AIDS 
has begun to stagnate,
1,5
 prompting renewed attention to the challenges of realizing long-term 
sustainability for HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment programming.
6-10
 
At the same time, there has been an evolving discourse around the notion of “ownership” in 
global health and development.  In 2005, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development published the Paris Declaration, which outlined five broad principles designed to 
produce more effective health and development programming: ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability.
11
  This international agenda 
expressed a priority of recognizing host-country agency and taking steps to ensure developing 
countries play a primary role in setting development priorities and shaping development efforts to 
respond to country needs.    
 Although many donor agencies and development initiatives have incorporated language of 
“country ownership” or sometimes “local ownership,”
12-16




universal.  For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation considers country ownership to 
be one principle that needs to be balanced with others, and allows host countries to set priorities 
for funding agreements after meeting certain eligibility criteria for cost-effectiveness and 
potential for results;
16
 UNAIDS describes country ownership as a process,  inclusive of key 
elements like strong political engagement and leadership, full participation of civil society, high 
quality data, capacity development and strong partnerships;
13
 the Global Fund points to an award 
process that builds country capacity for planning, coordination, and strengthens the agency of 
non-government actors as exemplary of country ownership;
17
 the U.S. Government’s Global 
Health Initiative defined country ownership along a spectrum, advancing towards a state in which 
host-countries manage, own, and finance their health sector.
14
  A recent multi-stakeholder 
consultation found no consensus definition of country ownership across initiatives, and 
emphasized that country ownership needs to recognize the roles of many local stakeholders, 
including government, civil society, and other local stakeholders.
18
    
In the context of HIV/AIDS programming, country ownership has taken on a more particular 
use that emphasizes a shift away from the parallel systems of HIV/AIDS service delivery 
supported during the initial “emergency response” phase and increasingly shifting to local actors 
the lead role for designing, planning, managing, delivering, and eventually financing HIV/AIDS 
programming to host country actors.
19
  Taken together, the slowing of donor resources for HIV, 
the shifting in priority from “emergency response” to “sustainability” and the evolution of the 
discourse around “ownership” have contributed to increasing efforts to transition programs 
operating through parallel, donor-funded systems to “local ownership” as a means to 
sustainability.
20,21
   However, given the multiple interpretations of ownership and diversity of 
actors relevant to considerations of “local” or “country” ownership, the relationship between 
transition, ownership and sustainability is not entirely clear.  Many developing country health 




availability, and civil society engagement,
22-25
 raising concern that premature transition may  
undermine, rather than enhance, the sustainability of gains made toward HIV/AIDS prevention 
and control.
26
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Given the current momentum for transitioning programs to local ownership, there is a need to 
understand with greater clarity how the process of transition is envisioned to achieve 
sustainability and local ownership.  What aspects of programs need to be transitioned to sustain 
their positive outcomes, and who ought to take them on?  What challenges does transitioning 
from a donor-supported parallel implementation system to a host-country system present, and 
how might they present threats to long-term sustainability of impact?  What responsibilities do 
donor agencies have with respect to transition?  
 This dissertation takes steps towards answering these questions through a case study of a 
large scale HIV-prevention program that has been relatively successful in transitioning to local 
ownership: the transition of Avahan – the India AIDS Initiative from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation to local actors in India. The Avahan transition was evaluated by a research team at 
Johns Hopkins University.
27
  This project complements the larger evaluation of the transition by 
investigating some of the conceptual, practical, and ethical issues that surround the notions of 
sustainability, ownership and program transition.   
 Avahan began in 2003 in response to the increasing HIV disease burden in the world’s most 
populous country.
28
  Chief among Avahan’s articulated goals were focusing prevention efforts on 
high-risk groups, achieving rapid scale-up of HIV prevention best-practices for high risk groups 
across a wide geographical area, and eventually transitioning the program to its “natural owners” 
of the government of India and local communities in order to achieve a sustained response.
28
  As 
a large scale HIV-prevention program with a clearly articulated intention of achieving sustained 




which to explore the conceptual, practical, and ethical questions raised above, which correspond 
to the three manuscripts comprising this dissertation.   
The first manuscript triangulates perspectives of 22 key informants interviewed as part of the 
empirical case study to develop a model of program sustainability that is both consistent with the 
intended outcomes of transition and the process of transitioning ownership as envisioned in the 
Avahan case.  The manuscript describes how the model was informed by the data and 
demonstrates its consistency with the envisioned process of transitioning ownership as described 
by key informants in order to illustrate the relationship between the process of transition and the 
outcomes it sought it achieve.  
The second manuscript describes in further detail key informant perceptions of the challenges 
experienced in transitioning the Avahan Initiative to the National AIDS Control Program of the 
Government of India, the programmatic changes that resulted, and the extent to which these 
changes were perceived as threats to the long-term sustainability of Avahan’s impact.  
The third manuscript uses the empirical experience of the Avahan transition as a motivating 
example for a normative analysis of donor responsibilities in the context of donor exit and their 
implications for the process of transition.  The argument begins by exploring the moral intuition 
expressed by a donor informant in the Avahan case to understand and characterize the morally 
relevant concern regarding transition, and then engages in a critical analysis of two existing 
normative accounts of responsibility to identify a moral basis for donor responsibilities in the 
process of transition.  
As a whole, these three manuscripts take on the conceptual, practical, and ethical challenges 
of program transition.  The findings from these manuscripts may inform future program 
transitions by facilitating more transparent discourse about the  intended goals of transitioning 
programs to local ownership, setting realistic expectations about the positive and negative 
consequences of transitioning to existing in-country health systems, and developing ethically 




end-users and enhances the sustainability of the positive impacts of donor investments in 
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Paper 1: Program sustainability as a system of roles and responsibilities: A conceptual 




Sustaining improvements in health outcomes beyond the life of specific donor-funded health 
initiatives has been a persistent concern for global health initiatives, yet one that has historically 
been overshadowed by the urgency of achieving results quickly.  As global health initiatives 
increasingly seek to transition programs to local ownership to enhance sustainability, there is a 
need to understand with greater clarity the relationship between the process of transitioning to 
local ownership and the outcomes it is intended to achieve.  This project used a case study 
approach to triangulate perspectives of 22 key informants involved in the transition of the Avahan 
Initiative from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to in-country actors.  This article presents a 
candidate model for program sustainability that relates the responsibilities transferred through 
transition to two dimensions of sustainability, Continued Service Delivery and Maintained 
Program Quality, which correspond to the intended sustainability outcomes of transition.  These 
outcomes are conceptualized as the results of the actions of actors filling a system of five 
interconnected roles: Leadership, Resource Allocation, Implementation, Strategic Program 
Management, and End-user Engagement.  Taken together, these roles form a complete system in 
which there is a feedback loop between service providers and end-users that sustains program 
outcomes over time.  This project further identifies a defining characteristic of ownership as the 
willing acceptance of the roles being transferred, and suggests that in order for transition to 
achieve the sustainability outcomes desired, it must include capacity-building and advocacy 
efforts sufficient to ensure local actors are both willing and able to carry out the responsibilities 
being transferred.  The model offers a candidate approach to transition planning as a transparent 







Sustaining gains of HIV/AIDS programming beyond the life of donor-funded initiatives has 
been a recognized concern,
1-6
 yet one that has until recently been overshadowed by the urgency of 
achieving results quickly.  Emergency-response initiatives such as the President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), have primarily used vertical programming approaches to deliver 
prevention, care, and treatment services in parallel to host-country delivery systems, prioritizing 
investments in rapid scale-up over investments in health systems.
7
  As donor assistance for 
HIV/AIDS programming has begun to stagnate in recent years,
8,9
 considerations for increasing 
aid effectiveness, strengthening country ownership and supporting country-owned capacity 
building have gained higher priority in HIV discourse as a means to promoting sustainability.
4,10,11
  
While there has been extensive discourse around the concepts of country ownership and 
sustainability, there remain uncertainties about how they translate into practice.
12-15
  Country 
ownership remains an imprecise term, articulated in multiple ways by different stakeholders 
without a shared definition or common translation into practice.
10,16-18
  Within HIV discourse, 
country ownership and local ownership communicate intentions of strengthening host country 
capacity and gradually shifting to host-countries greater responsibilities for leadership, technical 
capacity, and financial accountability.
10
  Moving towards greater use of host-country systems and 
strengthening country ownership as articulated in HIV/AIDS discourse would at some point 
necessitate a transition from the parallel donor-supported programs currently in place.  This sort 











  For many countries, 
however, the prospect of absorbing donor-supported programs presents significant financial, 
practical and political challenges
20-23
 and has raised concerns that rapid pursuit of country 
ownership may undermine, rather than enhance, the gains made in HIV/AIDS prevention and 
control.
24




of offloading donor accountability rather than strengthening host country capacity to address its 
own development priorities.
15
  This apparent tension between transitioning ownership of HIV 
programming and sustaining gains of donor investments in HIV suggests that the relationship 
between the process of transitioning ownership and the goal of sustainability may not be 
straightforward.   
Sustainability has multiple definitions, in particular with respect to what is being sustained.   
Interpretations within public health literature range from a singular focus on sustainability of 
specific program interventions
25,26
 to more complex processes of institutionalizing new 
innovations
27,28
 to yet more comprehensive aims of building the capacity of a system to address 
changing population needs over time.
29,30
   
While there is overlap between the concepts of sustainability and ownership, there remains a 
lack of clarity about how to facilitate sustainability while simultaneously transitioning to host-
country systems.   In order to plan for the long-term sustainability of the gains made with 
investments in parallel programming, there is a need to be transparent and specific about how 
transitioning such programs to local ownership is envisioned to sustain program outcomes. 
There are few examples in the academic literature of large-scale program transitions from 
which to gain practical insight into the outcomes that constitute sustainability following a 
transition in financing, management, or delivery, or what it means to have “ownership” of a 
program.  Evaluations of program sustainability are fragmented both in reference to the definition 
of sustainability employed as well as empirical outcomes measured,
30-33
 which makes it hard to 
define any broad consensus about the outcomes that represent program sustainability.  Further, 
conceptual models of sustainability largely focus on identifying capacities,
34
 or types of 
influencing factors,
26,29,35
 without linking them to particular actions or responsibilities that would 




In the gray literature, there are multiple sets of best-practices for donor exit that describe 
general recommendations for completing the transition process,
36-38
 yet they do not relate the 
process to specific outcomes representative of ownership or sustainability. Case examples of 
donor exit in agriculture and family planning suggest that transitions vary with respect to what 
they intend to sustain and the approach taken to transitioning ownership, for example, sustaining 
program delivery by building new institutions to take over implementation functions,
39
 or 
sustaining financing for commodities by transferring procurement responsibilities to existing 
government ministries.
40
  These reports capture different approaches to transition, and both are 
associated with sustainability and a version of ownership.  Yet, there is an absence of conceptual 
work regarding sustainability in the context of large-scale program transition that would assist 
practitioners in determining what needs to be sustained through transition and how transitions to 
local ownership can achieve it. 
This study aimed to take an initial step in clarifying the relationship between sustainability, 
ownership, and transition through an exploratory case study of transition of Avahan – The Indian 
AIDS initiative (hereafter referred to as “Avahan” or the “Avahan Initiative”).  This project 
aimed to develop a candidate model of program sustainability that clarifies how the roles 
transferred between actors in a program transition relate to specific outcomes of sustainability, 
and that can reflect the roles that local actors are understood to have in the ideal end-state of 
“ownership.”  The candidate conceptual model aims to reflect an idealized concept of program 
sustainability that may not be fully realized through transition, but serves as a starting place for 
identifying a vision of sustainability that is compatible with multiple stakeholder groups involved 
in a program transition.  Given that there may be different understandings of what transition is 
intended to achieve, as well as different understandings of what sustainability and ownership 
mean, the purpose of developing a candidate model from this case is to identify a potential vision 
of sustainability that could be sought through transition.  Although this vision may not be 




of how the concepts of sustainability and ownership are operating in the context of program 
transition.  It may also open a discussion among diverse stakeholders that facilitate progress 
towards a mutually compatible vision of transition and its intended outcomes.     
The transition of the Avahan initiative was selected as the case for the study as an example of 
a program initially designed to achieve results quickly, and delivered through a parallel financing, 
management, and delivery systems that later transitioned these responsibilities from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and partners to the Government of India (GOI) and other 
local actors. 
The Avahan Initiative has been described in detail elsewhere.
41,42
  Briefly, the Avahan 
Initiative began in 2003 with funding from BMGF, which supported a variety of HIV prevention 
programming activities that included HIV testing and counseling, STI care and prevention, as 
well as community mobilization and outreach activities.  These interventions were implemented 
through a network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were managed and provided 
with technical support through larger, often international NGOs, known as a State Lead Partners 
(SLPs).  The SLPs contracted smaller NGOs and some community based organizations (CBOs) to 
deliver targeted interventions to key populations of female sex workers (FSW), men who have 
sex with men (MSM), transgendered persons (TG) and injection drug users (IDUs) in four states 
in South India and two states in Northeast India.  Over the course of the next six years, Avahan 
scaled up to serve more than 280,000 key population members with HIV prevention services.
42
  
By 2006, BMGF had stated its intention to achieve a “sustained HIV response” by transitioning 
the program to “natural owners” of the program, the Government of India (GoI) and local 
communities.
42
  The Avahan transition involved transferring responsibility for the financing and 
management of Avahan programming from the BMGF to the GOI’s National AIDS Control 
Organization (NACO).  At the time of transition, NACO was supporting the majority of 






  Thus, India had a robust HIV/AIDS control program under which Avahan 
programming could be absorbed after transition.   As a large scale initiative with the stated 
intention of achieving sustainability through a transition in ownership, the Avahan transition 
presented an opportune case through which to explore the sustainability outcomes sought through 
transition, the responsibilities that were transferred in the process of transition, and the practical 
meaning of local ownership.   
Methods  
This study employed a case study approach treating the transition as the main unit of analysis.  
The case study aimed to develop a conceptual model that relates the process of transitioning 
ownership to specific sustainability outcomes.  Informed by the perspectives of a diverse sample 
of key informants involved in the Avahan transition, the candidate model is the analytic product 
of triangulating key informant perspectives about the concepts of transition, sustainability, and 
ownership in order to identify a candidate conceptual model that represents the convergence 
between these related yet distinct concepts.  The candidate model aims to provide a conceptual 
basis for understanding the interpretation of sustainability that transition is intended to achieve, 
and at the same time, illustrate which roles and responsibilities are important to transfer through a 
transition in program ownership in order to achieve the sustainability outcomes sought.   
Data collection.   One author (AP) conducted 22 in-depth interviews with key informants 
representing the perspectives of BMGF, GoI, and SLPs (Table 1).  Key informants were 
purposively selected to provide perspectives from different transition contexts.  Specifically, 
informants were selected to provide perspectives from the transition in two different geographic 
areas: Andhra Pradesh (referred to in the manuscript as the “South”), where programming 
focused on FSWs and MSM and where transition was completed relatively smoothly in three 
rounds spanning from 2009-2012, and the Northeast Region, where programming focused on 
IDUs and transition occurred later from 2012-13, following a more compressed timeline than in 




“giving” and “receiving” sides of transition.  Stakeholders from the BMGF and their contracted 
SLPs represented those on the “giving” side.  Stakeholders from the GoI at the national and state 
level, including representatives from NACO, SACS, as well as stakeholders in specialized 
Technical Support Units (TSUs) funded to provide technical support to NACO and SACS, were 
included from the “receiving side.”  Although some TSU informants had prior experience 
working with the Avahan Initiative and were not government employees, they were included as 
part of the “receiving” side as informants who had familiarity with the National AIDS Control 
Program and shared the experience of “receiving” programming previously supported by the 
Avahan Initiative.   Because the intention was to explore informants’ understanding of somewhat 
abstract concepts of “sustainability” and “ownership,” sampling was limited to high level 
informants who were anticipated to have a “big picture” understanding of transition, its goals, and 
its relationship to broader concepts; thus, frontline staff were not included as their perspective on 
transition was at a more granular level.  Interviews were conducted in English at multiple sites in 
Delhi, Hyderabad, and Guwahati, India between April and June 2013.  This timing coincided with 
the conclusion of the final stages of transition in the Northeast and the final period of post-
transition support in the South.  Informants were thus able to reflect on the transition in retrospect 
yet still have relatively recent experience to inform their responses.  Interviews were open-ended 
and followed an interview guide exploring informants’ understandings of the intended goals of 
transition, the concepts of ownership and sustainability, how the transition process was intended 
to achieve its goals, and the facilitating and challenging aspects of transition in achieving the 
intended goals.    
Data Analysis. Interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed by the interviewer, and uploaded 
into Atlas.ti for analysis.  Initial coding
44
 was applied following broad deductive categories 
corresponding to interview topics including the goals of transition, the conceptual understanding 
of sustainability and ownership, and the facilitators and barriers of the transition process as 




project was to explore concepts and construct concepts informed by the collective experience of 
key informants.   Based on initial application of categories to the data, a set of codes and sub-
codes were developed.  Codes replaced categories and codes were further refined into a set of 
sub-codes (e.g., “ownership” was broken into two emic categories of codes corresponding to 
“government ownership,” “community ownership;”  “sustainability” was broken into categories 
of “facilitating factors” and “constraining factors.”)   
Once the new set of codes and sub-codes were applied to the data, a second level of analysis, 
or second cycle coding
44 (p86)
 involved examining patterns within and between codes and sub-
codes.  First the relationship between the parent code and related sub-codes was defined.  For 
example, sub-codes of the parent code ‘sustainability’ were related as ‘facilitating functions’ or 
‘roles’, sub-codes of the parent code ‘ownership’ were related as ‘actions’ corresponding to  
“responsibilities,” and sub-codes for the parent code ‘goals of transition’ were grouped into sub-
codes including “ ‘continued delivery of services’, ‘maintained quality of services’, ‘retained 





 and data displays were used to further develop and refine these patterns of codes 
and sub-codes into emerging themes that characterized the concepts of sustainability, ownership, 
and described the goals of transition. 
After developing themes for each concept, the process of explanation building
45
 was used to 
identify the relationships between the concepts and develop a model that “explained” the intended 
outcomes of transition by relating factors of sustainability to the actions of ownership in a 
coherent way.  This was a process of identifying patterns between and among parent codes and 
sub-codes and identifying whether and how some emerging themes were relevant across the  
concepts of ‘sustainability’, ‘ownership’, and the ‘goals of transition’.  For example, the theme of 
‘leadership’ was found as important for both concepts of ‘sustainability’ and ‘ownership’ and 




of sustainability in the sense of sustaining attention and priority to HIV prevention.  In terms of 
‘ownership’, ‘leadership’ was consistent with actions demonstrating desire or want to take on 
responsibility.  In terms of the ‘goals of transition’, strong leadership was consistent with 
supporting resource mobilization and policy priority to continuing service delivery and 
supporting a commitment to quality.   Similarly, the theme of ‘ability to innovate and change 
according to data’ was related to the concepts of ‘sustainability’ and ‘ownership’ and consistent 
with sub-codes of ‘goals of transition’.  In terms of ‘sustainability’, the ability to innovate and 
change was described as a facilitator of sustainability.  In terms of ‘ownership’, ‘ability to 
innovate and change according to data’ was consistent with several actions described as part of 
government ownership. ‘Ability to innovate and change according to data’ was also consistent 
with the goal of maintaining program quality.  Identifying relationships across concepts and 
themes in this way led to the construction of a candidate model of program sustainability 
constructed in terms of roles and responsibilities and informed the placement of each role within 
the model.    
A further step was to test the hypothesized relationships in the model against the data.  This 
was an additional part of the explanation-building process of testing an initial proposition or 
explanation and against the data.
45(pp148-9)
   This was an iterative process of rearranging and 
refining the components in the model to make it consistent with the data.  Specifically, the 
relationships between particular roles and responsibilities in the model and outcomes of transition 
were tested against the description of the roles and responsibilities transferred through the process 
of “transitioning ownership” and its intended outcomes.  This tested whether the model could 
“explain” how the process of transitioning ownership described in the case would result in the 
intended outcomes described.  That is, this process ensured that the roles and responsibilities 
described by key informants in terms of “transitioning ownership” were captured by the model 
and the relevance of each role with respect to an intended outcome of transition was similarly 




identified in informants’ descriptions that was not somehow represented in the model; nor were 
there aspects of the model completely absent from description.    
Table 1: Key Informant Characteristics 
 
Stakeholder Perspective N Region Program Affiliation 
BMGF 6 Multi-state Avahan 
State Lead Partners 10 South (n=5) 
Northeast (n=5) 
Avahan 
Government of India 2 South (n=1) 
National(n=1) 
NACP 





TOTAL 22   
 
Results 
Results are presented in two sections.  Section 1 explains a candidate model of program 
sustainability that was developed inductively by triangulating the views of all key informants 
about the intended outcomes of transition and their understandings of the concepts of 
sustainability and ownership.   The components of the model are first described as a whole, 
followed by a description of how the components of the model were derived from the main 
themes of key informant perspectives.  The inductive model illustrates two dimensions of 
sustainability: Continuous Service Delivery and Maintained Program Quality.  These dimensions 
correspond to the intended outcomes of transition and are represented by a system of 
interconnected roles and responsibilities that work together to sustain health outcomes over time.  
Section 2 illustrates how the model described in Section 1 is consistent with the process of 
transitioning ownership as described by key informants in the Avahan case.  This section 
demonstrates the consistency between the roles and outcomes in the candidate model and the 
intended outcomes of transitioning ownership as described by key informants. Taken together, the 




ownership and the goal of sustainability as follows:  The sustainability outcomes associated with 
transition include Continuous Service Delivery and Maintained Program Quality.  These 
outcomes are achieved when actors are effectively filling each role, forming an interconnected 
system of roles and responsibilities.  The actors in this system each fill a role associated with 
either Continuous Service Delivery or Maintained Program Quality, that together form a 
complete system in which there is a feedback loop that supports the detection of changes in 
program performance and responsiveness to end-user needs, as well as a process of adaptive 
response that allows the program to change over time and remain effective in dynamic 
environments.  The process of transitioning to local ownership results in the intended 
sustainability outcomes when it includes capacity-building and advocacy sufficient to ensure that 
local actors are both willing and able to take over responsibilities previously filled by non-local 
actors, thereby maintaining a complete feedback loop within the system.  
Section 1: A Candidate Model for Program Sustainability as a System of Roles and 
Responsibilities 
 
The candidate model of program sustainability developed from this work focuses on two 
dimensions: Continuous Service Delivery and Maintained Program Quality (Figure 1).  The two 
dimensions of Continuous Delivery and Maintained Program Quality reflect the intended 
outcomes of transition; the five key roles and their associated responsibilities included in the 
model reflect the main themes of key informant understandings of the concepts of sustainability 




















The Continuous Delivery dimension is represented by the roles of Leadership, Resource 
Allocation, and Implementation, which are associated with the responsibilities of ensuring support 
for effective, responsive programming, allocating sufficient financial and human resources, and 
delivering high quality services, respectively (Figure 1, top row).  The outcome of Maintained 
Program Quality is represented by the roles of Strategic Program Management and End-User 
Engagement (Figure 1, bottom row).  The role of Strategic Program Management is associated 
with the responsibilities of routine monitoring and technical support, using data for strategic 
planning, supporting innovation, and advocating for evidence-based change.  The role of End-
User Engagement is associated with the responsibilities of recognizing and articulating end-user 
needs, generating demand for services, and holding program leadership accountable for the 




responsibilities, this model brings together the key facilitating factors of sustainability as roles 
with the representative actions associated with ownership as responsibilities.   
The dimensions of Continuous Service Delivery and Maintained Program Quality are linked 
by a feedback loop that is created when there are actors effectively filling all the roles in the 
model, ensuring there are mechanisms to both detect and respond to change (Figure 1, middle 
row).  This feedback loop creates a level of accountability between actors within the system that 
sustains the impact of the program over time.  The following narrative shows how the empirical 
data support the component roles and responsibilities in the model.  
Continuous Service Delivery  
 
 The Continuous Service Delivery dimension is represented by three roles: Leadership, 
Resource Allocation, and Implementation, which reflect the main themes that emerged as 
facilitators of the intended outcome of continuing service delivery post-transition.  Of these, 
leadership had an overarching importance given its potential to affect resource mobilization, 
allocation, and the future direction of the program.  As one informant commented,  
“I think the most critical [thing] is leadership.  From the government, not just to acknowledge, but 
also to actually take on a role – a proactive role –  in terms of prioritizing the right things, pushing the 
central government to put in the money they need, or donors or whoever it may be.  Really prioritizing HIV 
and making it have the resources that it needs.  Not more than it needs, not less than it needs, but exactly 
what it needs…  So at the time, and even today, high risk groups or MARPs … remain still to be the focus.  
Or the most strategic investment for India.  So one of the key goals was to make sure that the government is 
really focused on that, and the government is evidence based in where it puts its resources..” - #22 
(BMGF) 
Leadership was associated not only with mobilizing resources and having a strong influence 
on resource allocation, but also with ensuring that the direction of the program remained 
evidence-based, and that the policy approach supported effective programming.  This was 
corroborated by the importance that BMGF informants ascribed to aligning policy approaches 
with government leadership and pursuing transition at a time of strong government support for 




sufficient resource allocation was another facilitating factor because of its influence on the ability 
to support the costs of continued service delivery at scale.  Resources included both the financial 
costs of commodities and implementation, but also the human resources with necessary expertise 
to manage and support service delivery. 
   Key informants also identified the organizational and technical capacity of the 
implementation system, meaning the existing capacity of the public health system to support an 
effective body of implementing organizations, as a third facilitator of continuing service delivery 
post-transition.  As the informant below describes, sustaining service delivery through transition 
in the Avahan case was in part possible because of the prior investment in building the capacity 
of the implementation system, providing a relatively high level of functionality that made it 
possible to take on the additional organizations that Avahan had supported: 
“A lot of investment has gone into the public health system, in terms of infrastructure, equipment, 
human resources and capacity building, especially the front-line workers.  So it isn’t as if the health system 
is not really functional.  And therefore, transition is feasible in our context.” – #3 (TSU) 
Leadership, Resource Allocation, and Implementation are represented in the model as 
interconnected roles that together facilitate continuous service delivery (Figure 1 top row).  The 
responsibilities of Leadership,  which include acting as a policy champion to gain support for 
HIV prevention as an important political priority, mobilizing resources, and ensuring that the 
strategic approach is evidence based, are summarized in the model by the responsibility of 
ensuring effective, responsive programming.  The role of Resource Allocation carries the 
responsibility of ensuring sufficient resource allocation to support program implementation, 
inclusive of financial and human resources, and the role of Implementation is associated with the 
responsibility of delivering high quality services.  Continuous Service Delivery is thus the result 
achieved when all roles are filled: leadership ensures that sufficient resources are allocated to 
support a body of technically and organizationally competent implementing organizations to 




Maintained Program Quality Dimension  
The dimension of Maintained Program Quality includes two additional roles: Strategic 
Program Management and End-user Engagement (Figure 1, bottom row), which reflect key 
themes that emerged from key informant discussions about ensuring that the quality of the 
program did not diminish post-transition. 
Strategic Program Management captures the importance of being able to remain effective 
over time by reacting to changing trends in program performance.  This is partly accomplished by 
routine monitoring and evaluation, but additionally requires using data to inform future 
programming activities and change the program when current strategies cease to be effective.  As 
one informant reflected about the challenge of sustaining high quality services in the Northeast,  
 “So, for example, in drug use – drug use is never the same.  The trend keeps changing, depending on 
the availability [of drugs] – it’s very dynamic and unless you change yourself according to the trend, then, 
you know your program can become very irrelevant.  ….  So changing, adapting your program from your 
data, from what your data tells you and what you observe is tougher, you know, but I think that brings out 
quality in a program.”  - #14 (SLP) 
An additional element to this process of adaptive change was the notion of advocacy to 
encourage the adoption of new practices.  Advocacy was a key theme relating to the role that the 
management staff played in both the Avahan and NACP programs in facilitating changes in 
program delivery based on monitoring data, or in some cases, the results of pilot projects 
undertaken by an implementing partner.  Key informants from SLPs, who were engaged in 
management for BMGF, described the importance of advocating to and negotiating with those in 
leadership positions at NACO and SACS to ensure that new, more effective approaches to 
implementation continued after transition and maintained program quality.    
       The importance of the ability to identify and respond to change is captured by the Strategic 
Program Management role in the model, and is associated with the responsibilities of routine 
monitoring, using data for strategic planning, supporting innovation, and advocating for the 
adoption of evidence based change.  These actions together ensure that the program is able to 




new, more effective approaches.  The responsibilities of Strategic Program Management have a 
critical role in connecting the feedback produced through monitoring with strategic planning, 
mechanisms of innovation and advocacy for evidence-based changes.  Each of these 
responsibilities contributes to a process through which changes in program performance are 
detected and an adjustment or novel approach is identified and proposed.  The advocacy 
responsibility loops back to the leadership role by conveying the needed adjustment or novel 
approach to those who have the authority to modify guidelines and allocate resources as 
necessary to support the identified approach.  Together, the actors fulfilling these responsibilities 
ensure that this aspect of program quality is translated back into the service delivery dimension. 
End-user Engagement is the final role in the model, representing the significance that key 
informants attributed to the role of key population communities in sustaining the quality of the 
program post-transition.   SLP informants from both the South and the Northeast emphasized the 
role of end-user communities in the long-term prevention of HIV.  As one informant explained 
their contribution to sustainability:  
“…educating their peers, in terms of motivating their peers to get into the program, to go get enrolled 
in the program and seek services from the program.  And once they have seen people who accept them, 
with their sex workers identity, they felt very much comfortable in that forum.  They have started asking for 
services, they have started expressing their problems, their hindrances with the system.  And they’ve asked 
them to seek services from government, for STI…They have started expressing their difficulties with the 
program and slowly the program hand-holding them in negotiating with the government officers…  Without 
that empowerment and without that people taking ownership, it would not sustain.” – #6 (SLP) 
 
GoI informants also expressed the view that the ability of end-users to advocate for their 
needs and hold government accountable was critical for sustaining program quality over time:  
“…The sense of accountability, responsibility to yourself - that you matter to yourself!  It is important that 
that feeling is really there among each one of them.  That is what will sustain the program.  That we care 
so much that after Avahan left, this wretched government fellow, he has come in and he is asking for a 
bribe for things that we are entitled to, and which we want – I’m going to protest! … The [people living 
with HIV/AIDS] will not take any nonsense…  if the drugs are not there, they’ll be at my table saying, 





Thus, the role of End-user Engagement captures several responsibilities that enhance the 
quality of service delivery, including recognizing and voicing local community needs, generating 
demand for services, and holding leadership accountable for the relevance and quality of services.  
Summary of Section 1 
The candidate model of program sustainability reflects a system of interconnected roles and 
responsibilities that, when filled, create a feedback loop that supports mechanisms to detect and 
respond to change within a system.  The roles and responsibilities of Leadership, Resource 
Allocation, and Implementation constitute the political support, resources, and capacity to 
continue service delivery, while the roles and responsibilities of Strategic Program Management 
and End-User Engagement allow for the identification of effective implementation strategies, 
recognition of how responsive programming is to user-identified needs, and advocacy from those 
in management to put effective approaches into practice and from end-users to respond to their 
needs.  When the actors in the Leadership role are receptive to the feedback offered by those in 
the roles of Strategic Program Management and End-user Engagement, the system gains an 
internal accountability that supports both outcomes of Continuous Service Delivery and 
Maintained Program Quality.  
 
Section 2: Transitioning Ownership as a Process of Reallocating Roles and Responsibilities 
 
This section describes the intended transfer of roles and responsibilities in the Avahan 
transition, and illustrates how the process of “transferring ownership” as described by key 
informants is consistent with achieving program sustainability through the system of roles and 
responsibilities described in Section 1.  Because this section is intended to apply the candidate 
model of program sustainability proposed above by explicating the transition of ownership as the 
transfer of roles and responsibilities, specific key informant stakeholder groups are identified 




redistributed from “Avahan” actors (BMGF, SLPs) to GoI actors (e.g. NACO, SACS, or TSU) 
and key population communities.    
Key informants from BMGF and SLPs characterized the goal of the Avahan transition as the 
transfer of ownership, relying on both government and community actors to play a role in the 
long term sustainability of the program’s impact, as one informant from BMGF explained the 
overarching goal of transition:  
“So just think, you know, you build a great college in a town.  A nice building, you know you get some 
good, some reasonably good faculty in there, but, if the people in the town or the village that this college is 
built in don’t actually sign up to go use the college, if they don’t understand how to work together to hold 
the college responsive to their needs, i.e., provide the types of courses that are relevant to the needs of the 
population, don’t understand how to hold the college accountable for good quality education, right, it just 
becomes an edifice.  So, in some sense, a lot of what was built and what gets transferred to the government 
is the edifice.  What keeps it actually a vital, vibrant, long-lasting institution is the community ownership.  
And that balance has to happen” - #1 (BMGF) 
Transition thus represents a process of transferring the roles previously filled by BMGF and 
partners to GoI and key population communities in order to ensure continued service delivery as 
well as the quality and relevance of services delivered.  
Government Ownership: Transferring Roles of Leadership and Resource Allocation and 
Strategic Program Management to Government.   
Informants from BMGF, GoI, and SLPs were in consensus that one primary goal of transition 
to government was the continuing provision of HIV prevention services to the communities that 
had been served by the Avahan Initiative.  Through NACO’s acceptance of responsibility to 
continue to provide support for HIV prevention and to allocate resources sufficient to finance 
programming that was previously supported by BMGF, the roles of Leadership and Resource 
Allocation were transferred to NACO.  Multiple informants additionally felt it was important for 
the specific organizations that had been supported by BMGF to continue to be supported by 
NACO in order to retain the capacity that had been built and the relationships with communities 
that had been developed under Avahan.  The process of aligning the practices of these NGOs to 




management and made it possible to retain their role in implementation.  One informant from a 
TSU explained the goal of sustainability achieved by the transition to government, as follows: 
“…these NGOs had been supported by Avahan financially as well as through management support, 
through capacity-building support, Avahan had invested their time even to build up the organizational 
capacity.  And this had happened for 5-6 years, almost for a decade, so, when Avahan is stepping out, these 
NGOs have the capacity to bid independently, even to NACO.… But suppose there is a gap.  Then what 
happens on the ground is, the NGO dissipates very quickly.  The empowerment, the capacities that you 
have sort of built, that you have worked with the community – the people just sort of move out very quickly.  
Sustainability ensured that these NGOs were transferred and NACO gave a commitment that it would 
continue to support these NGOs so that they could continue to work with the communities that they had 
been working with.” - #3 (TSU) 
 
By making a commitment to continue to provide support for HIV prevention and to allocate 
resources sufficient to finance and support the Avahan programming, the roles of Leadership and 
Resource Allocation were transferred to NACO.  In order to retain the service delivery capacity 
and relationships with communities that had been built with Avahan support, many of the same 
organizations remained in the implementation role and contributed to the achievement of 
continuous service delivery.   
BMGF also sought to transition to government the management aspects of the program.  Prior 
to transition, the BMGF-funded SLPs had filled the management role, engaging in intense 
monitoring, use of data for strategic planning, and periodic innovation by conducting pilot 
projects of new approaches to improve quality.   In order to ensure the management role remained 
filled after transition, BMGF felt it was important that the government system support a 
management role comparable to that filled by SLPs, which was described as being filled in part 
by the TSUs.  As one informant explained, the introduction of TSUs into the national system was 
a way of transferring multiple management responsibilities associated with the quality of 
programming: 
“….most of the government machinery is built around delivering programs, right.  But what actually 
monitors the appropriateness of the programs, the quality of the programs, the consistency of those 
programs?  [The role of TSUs] was really to help the government to make the changes they needed to make 
to keep the program true, and of good quality.  The second role of the TSU, that the SLPs played critically, 
is to actually be a thinking, strategic unit…for example, a new typology of sex worker has come about… So 




protocol has been built around people who can be physically identified and physically accessed….so is 
there someone actually thinking about that and is there someone actually saying, what can we do about 
it?” - #1 (BMGF) 
By facilitating support for TSUs within the government system, BMGF and other actors 
sought to ensure that there remained actors able to take on responsibilities of monitoring, using 
data for strategic planning, and, innovating when necessary, to respond to new threats and keep 
program quality high.  The TSUs also took on responsibilities for putting new practices into 
action.  As one informant explained, 
“See luckily, in all the states the TSU was very helpful because TSU was like professional management 
agency.  They understand the nuances, the quality of the program.  Whatever they proposed, with some 
amendments, it was actually accepted and taken up.  It really helped the government as well as NGOs.” -#9 
(SLP) 
Thus, the transfer of the strategic management role from the BMGF-supported SLPs to TSUs 
represented a transfer of the Strategic Program Management role and its responsibilities from the 
donor to local actors.  
An overarching theme among key informants in describing transition to government was the 
notion of acceptance, emphasizing that transferring ownership required not only that government 
be able to take on these roles and responsibilities, but that they want to take them on, which 
would be expressed in policy as well as among individuals in leadership positions.  As one 
informant remarked,  
“For the programs to run successfully and sustain the quality after we leave, and for it to be funded, 
the background is that the government should have in its policy the fact that they want to work with high 
risk groups, that they want to saturate high risk groups, and they have operational guidelines on how to 
implement programs with high risk groups.  So in a way that is the heart and soul of transition and if that 
happens, fine, then they take over the programs and stuff will work.” - #20 (BMGF) 
 
Similarly, an informant from the TSU remarked on a defining feature of successful transition:  
 
    “I would call it a success the moment that the government feels that, I mean, it’s our program…. When 
you see a [project director] talking about this, and my state and my program and all, you see kind of an 
ownership happening. They should start talking like that at different forums at the state level, the district 
level and the NACO level.  So that kind of ownership should come from the government there.  That is very, 





 Accordingly, the willing acceptance of relevant responsibilities by government is a key 
condition for the successful transfer of ownership and the achievement of the sustainability 
outcomes desired.  
Community Ownership: Transferring the Role and Responsibilities of End-User 
Engagement to Communities 
The roles transferred to communities, described by key informants as transferring ownership 
to communities, were perceived by many informants to be of primary importance for the 
maintained quality of program implementation.  In transferring ownership to end-user 
communities, BMGF sought to transform the role of communities from passive recipients of 
services to engaged users, and eventually, empowered advocates for the continued quality and 
relevance of services.   
  Transferring this role to communities was described as a process that starts with engaging 
individuals as active participants and later spreads to create empowered communities.  SLP 
informants in both the South and the Northeast described the value of the community 
mobilization activities supported by BMGF as understanding the underlying needs of the 
communities, generating demand, and empowering individuals to become advocates capable of 
holding government accountable for the provision of services.  In the Northeast, community 
participation was in the beginning stages at the time of transition, and one critical aspect of 
transition for SLP informants in the Northeast was to ensure that SACS continued to encourage 
such participation from communities, as one informant explained:  
“Now, sustainability depends on the seriousness and the importance that the SACS give to that 
aspect- the role that these communities play… Quality everyone would like.  And to actually ensure quality, 
you need the active involvement of the community…. there are actually some very, some have become real 
advocates in their communities and it is all a result of the community mobilization process.” # 11 (SLP) 
    In the South, key population communities had progressed much further in the process of 
empowerment, and it was seen as more feasible to transfer the responsibilities of End-User 




population communities; in the South, there was an existing history of community activism 
among the FSW and MSM communities served and some baseline level of community capacity, 
whereas in the NE, the IDU communities faced extreme marginalization and the continual 
challenges of addiction, which further complicated the development of individual agency and 
community collectivization that were part of the empowerment process.  As one informant in the 
South explained the long-term vision of transferring ownership to the FSW community,  
“You know, metaphorically speaking, there is a table at which partners sit, and citizens of India could 
sit, saying, We want what is our right.  And the sex worker literally could have a seat at the table saying, 
‘We want HIV prevention, we want clinic access, we want X and Y.’  And that was our effort… So, what are 
we transferring to communities?  Build their capability to get that seat at the table and to manage 
themselves.” - #17 (BMGF) 
Thus, while the transition of ownership to communities was further along in the South, in 
both cases, it was important to ensure the role of End-User Engagement remain filled to ensure 
the continued quality of services delivered.  This was instrumental to the long-term goal of 
empowering key population communities to be effective advocates for their own interests.  
  Similar to the notion of transferring ownership to government, the transition of ownership to 
key population communities was only viewed as successful if the communities wanted to 
continue to engage in the programs delivered.  Informants from BMGF, SLPs, and GoI felt that 
ownership was demonstrated by community members’ wanting to engage with the program for 
the intrinsic value of HIV prevention and encouraging others to do so.  As one informant from 
government explained,  
“…ownership is a big word, but I’m just saying sense of accountability to yourself, to the program, 
and then from there, you know, you want it so you’ll see that your other colleagues also in the program 
behave accordingly, so then that it becomes a community ownership.  That we are doing this for ourselves.  
And we are the gainers in the bargain.”  -  #5 (NACO) 
 
Thus, the long-term goal of transferring ownership to communities was envisioned as a 
process of reallocating the role of End-User Engagement from the SLPs and NGOs who had been 




user communities in becoming effective advocates, to the end-user communities who would 
eventually become effective advocates on their own.  Through the process of empowerment, key 
population communities were envisioned to gradually take on the responsibilities of recognizing 
and voicing their own needs, generating demand among their peers, and holding government 
accountable for the provision of services they needed to protect themselves from HIV.   
While the Avahan transition also included efforts to transition the role of Implementation 
from NGOs to grassroots CBOs comprised of members of key population communities, their role 
as implementers was described by BMGF and SLP informants as having secondary importance 
for sustaining service delivery.  Although supporting grassroots CBOs in an implementation role 
was endorsed by both NACO’s policies and by BMGF, BMGF and SLP informants suggested 
that the critical responsibilities for community members to take on post-transition were to 
generate demand among their peers and act as advocates for their needs.  BMGF and SLP 
informants explained that transitioning some implementation responsibility to CBOs enhanced 
sustainability to the extent that it allowed some members of end-user communities to have first-
hand experience with service delivery and better understand what was necessary to deliver high 
quality services.  Having this practical experience within end-user communities was perceived to 
enhance their ability to hold government accountable for the quality, relevance, reliability, and 
availability of services they need.  
Summary of Section 2 
 Taken together, the vision of successful transfer of ownership to government and community 
actors described by informants amounted to filling all the roles and responsibilities in the system: 
Leadership and Resource Allocation were transferred to government actors (NACO), the 
previously BMGF-supported implementing organizations were retained in the role of 
Implementation, the TSUs took on the role of Strategic Program Management, and end-user 




of End-user Engagement.   For both government and key population communities, the notion of 
ownership was characterized not only by having capacity to perform the responsibilities 
associated with the role being offered, but truly wanting to take it on.  
   Transferring ownership in this sense is only possible when government and community 
actors are both willing and able to carry out the responsibilities for the roles transferred to them.  
Successful transition of ownership was envisioned as filling all of the roles and responsibilities in 
the model in Section 1 with willing and able actors: Government would be willing and able to 
mobilize and allocate the resources necessary to support implementing organizations in the 
delivery of high quality services to end-users, who, in turn, value the services enough to continue 
to engage in the program, and are collectively able to hold government to account for the 
provision of high-quality services that are responsive to their needs.  This distribution of roles 
creates a level of accountability between service providers and end-users that is consistent with 
the feedback loop in the candidate model proposed in Section 1.  Ultimately, it is this 
accountability that drives the long-term sustainability of HIV control in these communities.   
Discussion  
Through a case study of the Avahan transition experience, this project sought to clarify the 
relationship between the process of transition and the intended outcomes of program 
sustainability and local ownership. The candidate model of program sustainability resulting from 
this work frames program sustainability as inclusive of the outcomes of Continuous Service 
Delivery and Maintained Program Quality, which result from a system of interconnected roles 
and responsibilities.  The candidate model allows for a transparent representation of the shift in 
roles and a responsibility sought through transition, and further, suggests that the outcomes of 
Continuous Service Delivery and Maintained Program Quality are determined by the extent to 




emergent outcome that results from successfully transferring all key roles in the system to actors 
both capable and willing to take to on the responsibilities associated with the role.  
The internal validity of the candidate model is strengthened by the high level of convergence 
of perceptions between informants regarding the roles that were transferred through transition and 
their relevance to the sustainability outcomes of Continuous Service Delivery and Maintained 
Program Quality.  The consensus on the relationship between the process and intended outcomes 
was strong, and likely reflects a “mature” understanding of the transition that became clearer in 
hindsight.  Further, many of the key roles identified in the model of program sustainability are 
supported in prior literature identifying leadership or political commitment, resource availability, 
organizational capacity, and participant or community engagement as facilitating factors of 
sustaining effective interventions or innovations.
26,34,35,46,47
  Similarly, the overarching ability to 
change and adapt has also been identified as a critical facilitator in maintaining impact over 
time.
34,47-49
  There is substantial overlap between the roles identified in this model and key 
components of health systems.
50
  This reinforces the notion that strong health systems can 
enhance program sustainability, and offers additional support for the importance of ensuring there 
is an actor both willing and able to fill the roles identified in the model in order to sustain 
program outcomes through transition.   
The candidate model of program sustainability as a system of roles and responsibilities also 
builds off of existing sustainability literature in multiple ways.   While others have applied a 
systems approach to develop broad conceptual models of sustainability,
30,49,51
 the candidate model 
is novel in that it organizes key functions of sustainability in a way that is both descriptive of the 
facilitating factors of sustainability and illustrative of their relationship to  specific sustainability 
outcomes of Continuous Service Delivery and Maintained Program Quality.   The presence of a 
feedback loop in the model takes a step away from traditionally linear logic models of program 






  By linking the facilitating factors of sustainability with responsibilities that can 
be assigned to specific actors, the candidate model may facilitate the operationalization of 
sustainability in practical policy settings characterized by actions of stakeholders rather than by 
the presence or absence of “factors” or “facilitators.”  
 The candidate model may facilitate more transparent discourse around transitions to local 
ownership and sustainability.  Employing the candidate model in transition planning could clarify 
which roles are intended to be transitioned to specific in-country actors.  For example, the 
candidate model could clearly distinguish a selective transition involving only the transfer of the 
role of financing from a donor to a government actor, leaving a donor’s fulfillment of other roles 
and responsibilities unchanged, from a more comprehensive transition in which multiple roles are 
transferred.  Such an approach might allow for the identification of typologies of transition that 
could inform more directed capacity-building and advocacy efforts in preparation for transition, 
depending of the type of transition being pursued.  The candidate model may also allow planners 
to anticipate consequences of transitioning specific roles to actors either unwilling or unable to 
carry out the responsibilities of their role.  For example, successfully transferring the roles of 
Leadership, Resource Allocation and Implementation but not Strategic Program Management or 
End-user Engagement might succeed in achieving continuous service delivery post-transition, but 
might result in declining quality over time.   
Further, the candidate model can inform discourse around the meaning of “ownership” in the 
context of transition by providing a way to translate the concept of ownership into a specific 
constellation of roles assigned to specific local actors.  For BMGF, the concept of ownership 
motivating transition was labeled “natural ownership” wherein government was assigned roles of 
Leadership and Resource Allocation, and key population communities were assigned the role of 
End-user Engagement.  While the remaining roles of Implementation and Strategic Program 




Strategic Program Management was assigned to government supported TSUs, and 
Implementation to grassroots NGOs and CBOs, these roles could potentially have been filled by a 
variety of actors so long as they were both willing and able to take them on.  By providing a 
framework with which to illustrate the specific roles transferred to specific local actors, the 
candidate model can serve to illustrate what is meant by “country ownership” in a particular 
transition setting.  This model would allow for variation with respect to which local actors filled 
these roles, avoiding the assumption that ownership necessarily requires host country 
governments to fill all of the roles in the candidate model, or that civil society organizations 
necessarily take on the role of implementation, or even that there is a unique distribution of roles 
that constitutes country ownership.  Rather, the strength of the candidate model is ultimately in its 
suggestion that what is important to ensure is that there is some actor effectively fulfilling the 
responsibilities of each role.  When all roles are effectively filled by local actors, the program 
supports mechanisms of accountability between service providers and end-users that ultimately 
drives the sustainability of impact in the absence of continued donor support.  The concepts of 
government and community ownership described in this case study suggest that the critical roles 
that government should take on are that of Leadership and Resource Allocation.  Government 
was perceived to be the actor with the decision-making authority and ability to mobilize the 
magnitude of resources needed to ensure continued programming of similar quality.  The critical 
role transferred to end-user communities in the Avahan transition was that of End-user 
Engagement, as key population communities are the actor in the system in the best position to 
articulate their needs, generate demand among their peers, and hold government to account for 
continued provision of quality, relevant services.  The remaining roles could be filled by a variety 
of actors, depending on their willingness and capacity to effectively fulfill the responsibilities of a 




Finally, the notion of ownership as a willing and able acceptance of responsibilities suggests 
that transition cannot succeed as a unilateral endeavor of donors.  While donors can do much to 
facilitate the transition of roles in terms of capacity-building prior to transition, capacity-building 
alone may be insufficient without commensurate investment in dialogue, advocacy, and 
negotiation with transition partners to ensure their willing acceptance of the roles being 
transitioned.  This requires flexibility on the part of the donor to develop transition plans 
constructively and collaboratively with host-country actors, and to be willing to adjust timelines 
and levels of investment when necessary to ensure successful transfer of ownership.   
The limitations of this model and its application to the Avahan transition process are as 
follows.   First, the candidate model presupposes that sustaining the impact of the program 
requires on-going implementation; program sustainability is therefore assumed to be a means to 
addressing an on-going health threat, rather than a goal in itself.  Additionally, the roles identified 
in the model are general representations, and likely embody many responsibilities of smaller 
scope that cumulatively fulfill the responsibilities of each role.  The nuance of what specific 
responsibilities are representative of each of these roles is an area for further inquiry.   Finally, the 
candidate model is the reflection of a process as it was envisioned by one donor in one country 
for one program.  The value and transferability of the candidate model can be tested in a variety 
of other settings.  While the specific reallocation of roles that occurred in the Avahan transition is 
likely highly context specific, the candidate model may be applicable to donor supported HIV 
prevention programs in other settings that involve transition of fewer or different combinations of 
roles to different sets of actors.   
Further, while this model was informed by perspectives of key informants affiliated with 
government, donor, and implementing organizations, the informants interviewed in this work 
more heavily represent the “donor” or “Avahan” perspective on transition, with relatively few 
informants sharing government views and no representation from end-user communities.  While 




this sample of informants, the candidate model described here is not intended to represent a 
universal understanding of sustainability, ownership, and the goals of transition.  Rather, it 
provides one way of conceptualizing program sustainability that may or may not resonate with 
other stakeholder groups.  A model such as the one developed here may provide a basis for 
discussion between stakeholder groups with respect to their understandings of sustainability, 
ownership and the intended outcomes of transition, and may facilitate the identification of where 
perspectives on these core concepts overlap and where they diverge.  Ultimately, this may inform 
the development of a transition strategy that is compatible with multiple perspectives on 
sustainability and the intended outcomes of transition.   
By suggesting that successful transfer of ownership requires both the willingness and ability 
to take on the responsibilities of roles transferred, this work may also facilitate an open discussion 
as to whether transitioning specific responsibilities at a given time is likely to undermine or 
enhance the long-term sustainability of a donor-supported program, and lead to clear and realistic 
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Paper 2:  Understanding the challenges of program transition and potential threats to 




This case study reports on the challenges of transitioning a donor-driven program to local 
ownership, the programmatic changes that resulted from adapting a donor-developed program to 
function within the government system, and the potential threats these changes pose to long-term 
sustainability of outcomes.  Key informants from both the donor and the national programs 
identified challenges related to the lower costing structure, limited flexibility of budgeting and 
implementation, and limited technical expertise with community-oriented activities within the 
national program.  These challenges led to numerous programmatic changes including reduced 
investment in program management, interruptions in context-specific activities, heightened 
barriers to innovation and data-driven change, and diminished focus on community mobilization 
and empowerment.  Of these changes, the reduced opportunity for data-driven change and 
diminished focus on community mobilization and empowerment were perceived as the strongest 
potential threats to the long-term sustainability of the program’s impact.  These findings suggest 
that even when transition is successful in maintaining service delivery outcomes, there may 
nevertheless be potentially significant changes to program implementation that merit additional 
commitment from donors, particularly with respect to activities that require high flexibility and 
specialized technical expertise.  These findings further suggest that it may be important to 
monitor a variety of outcomes post-transition.  Measures of user retention, staff turnover, and 
behavior change among end-user populations may provide more nuanced information about 








The long-term sustainability of HIV epidemic control has increasingly raised concerns in the 
global health community.
1-6
  Recent reports document stagnation and in some cases decline of 
donor commitments to global HIV support
7,8
 as well as private sector contributions to HIV 
financing.
9
  Although domestic contributions have increased substantially in the last decade, 
donor funds still account for nearly half of all HIV/AIDS financing,
10
 raising concern for the 
potential consequences of diminished investment in HIV prevention, care, and treatment.  
Diminishing donor investment is particularly concerning in countries where significant portions 
of HIV programs are financed and implemented through donor-supported systems working in 
parallel to domestic public health systems that have little capacity to absorb and finance 
additional programming.  While inconsistent with recognized principles of aid effectiveness 
promoting use of in-country institutions and delivery systems,
11
 parallel programming has 
nonetheless been supported as a means to achieving results quickly, as illustrated by early, 
emergency-response phases of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and, 
to a lesser extent, the Global Fund for AIDs, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM).
12,13
  However, 
as priorities begin to move beyond emergency response programming, there is increasing interest 
in transitioning the parallel systems of donor-supported programs to host-country delivery 
systems as a means to both scaling-up effective practices and facilitating the long-term 
sustainability of program delivery.
14-17
 
For this project, the notion of transition is intended to convey an intentional process of 
transferring programming responsibilities from one set of actors to another, in contrast to 
relatively abrupt cessation of donor support without a coordinated transfer of responsibilities to 
new actors.  To use the language applied to type of donor exit strategies, transition here is 




continue after the cessation of donor support by new actors, as opposed to phase-out, which 
involves a cessation of program support without intention to transfer a program to new actors.
18 
In the context of transitions to local ownership in the current HIV landscape, transitioning a 
program that has been developed using a parallel, donor supported system to an existing host-
country system will likely involve some degree of change.  Such programs, even if generally 
similar to national programs focused on HIV prevention, care, and treatment, may nonetheless 
operate with different programming priorities, costing structures, and management practices, and 
thus may require some degree of adaptation, or “alignment,” to function within the norms and 
constraints of public health systems.  This alignment process would include reconciling 
differences in budget allocations and operational norms, but may also include modifications to the 
broader approach of program implementation that are not captured through operational 
guidelines, such as the priorities, values, and general character of program function.  Thus, 
although transitions are intended to sustain program benefits over the long-term, transition is 
ultimately a process of change, and its impact on the programming that continues after the 
withdrawal of donor support is unclear.    
While there are few examples of large-scale program transition in the academic literature, 
there are many evaluations of sustainability following transitions in financing at an organizational 
level in public health programs.  Evaluations of sustainability following transitions in funding 
have shown that some level of change is common,
19,20
 and that an outcome of “partial 
sustainability,” in which some but not all aspects of programming are continued, is most 
common.
19-21
  For example, organizations experiencing a transition in financing have been shown 
to deliver a reduced range of services, continue services at fewer location sites, or change some 
aspects of the quality of services.
20
  Evaluations of community based programming have come to 








 There are fewer evaluations addressing transition in a development context and at a systems 
level, in which large-scale programs have been transitioned to new funding or delivery systems, 
which more closely represent the kind of transition relevant to global HIV/AIDS programming.  
A report documenting the graduation of several Latin American countries from USAID support to 
host country financing for family planning suggests a high level of sustainability in terms of the 
numbers of local organizations that remained post-graduation, yet significant changes were 
reported with respect to the populations served following the initiation of user-fees, which was a 
strategy adopted to achieve financial sustainability.
23
  Initial reports of the transition of PEPFAR 
HIV services in South Africa suggest that, while the government continued to provide services 
after the cessation of PEPFAR funding, large numbers of patients may have fallen out of care, 
and those who were retained experienced increased wait times and changes in the experience of 
service utilization.
24
  A review of sustainability of upper-middle income and high-income Global 
Fund countries found that countries were more likely to prioritize public funding for treatment 
drugs and prevention activities targeting youth, but not for HIV prevention services directed to 
most-at-risk populations.
25(p35)
  These experiences suggest that transitions in financing, 
management, and implementation are often accompanied by a variety of significant programmatic 
changes at both the level of individual organizations and delivery systems as a whole.  Yet, 
categorical assessments of sustainability that measure only the persistence of service delivery or 
the portion of organizations that continue to deliver services in any form mask many of the more 
nuanced changes in program delivery that may occur through the process of transition.
20
 Further, 
there is little consensus on how to identify and interpret the changes that do occur.
19
  Not all types 
of programmatic changes are necessarily undesirable.  For example, changes in the types of 




drift from the true needs of the target population; reductions in implementation sites may reflect a 
more efficient system or, conversely, higher burden for those accessing services.  Thus, the notion 
that transitioning financing, management, and implementation to in-country actors will result in 
sustainable impact rests on multiple currently underexplored assumptions about the 
consequences, both positive and negative, of transition.   
Through a case study of the transition of the Avahan-the India AIDS Initiative (hereafter 
referred to as “Avahan” or “the Avahan Initiative”) from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
(BMGF) to the Government of India (GoI), this study aimed to explore the ways in which 
transitioning a donor-supported, parallel HIV prevention program to an existing national program 
resulted in changes to the donor program and the extent to which such changes may present 
threats to sustainability.  Operating in India from 2003-2013, Avahan was an HIV-prevention 
initiative funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) that has been described in 
detail elsewhere.
26,27
  Briefly, the Avahan Initiative began in 2003 with funding from BMGF, 
which supported a variety of HIV prevention programming activities targeted to key populations 
of female sex workers (FSW), men who have sex with men (MSM), transgendered persons and 
injection drug users (IDUs) in four states in South India and two states in Northeast India.  
Avahan supported a variety of HIV prevention approaches including STI care and prevention, 
HIV testing and counseling, and community mobilization and empowerment activities.  These 
interventions were implemented through a network of mostly grassroots non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  In each state, BMGF funded a larger, often international NGO, known as 
a State Lead Partner (SLP) to manage implementation and provide technical support to the 
implementing organizations.      
Between 2003 and 2008, Avahan scaled up these interventions to serve more than 280,000 
FSW, MSM, transgendered persons, and IDUs.
27
  By 2006, BMGF had stated its intention to 
achieve a “sustained HIV response” by transitioning the program to “natural owners.”
27




included the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) and State AIDS Control Societies 
(SACS) of the GoI, and communities of key populations constituting the end-users of the services 
provided under the Avahan Initiative.  BMGF and the GoI invested significantly in preparing for 
transition, working collaboratively to develop a phased transition strategy that involved planned 
coordination and alignment with the National AIDS Control Program (NACP) implemented by 
NACO.
26
  As part of the transition effort, BMGF and GoI signed a memorandum of 
understanding to mark a mutual intention of a smooth transition of programs funded by BMGF to 
NACO when BMGF funding terminated.
28
  GoI supported a highly inclusive consultative process 
in the development of the third phase of NACP, and BMGF had the opportunity to inform the 
operational guidelines of NACP with practical experience from the Avahan Initiative.
29
  The 
budget for NACP increased markedly between the second and third phases of the NACP, and the 
budget for the third phase of NACP took into consideration the costs of absorbing additional 
programs previously funded by Avahan.
26
  
The context of the Avahan transition therefore included a relatively well financed national 
AIDS control program, with relatively strong implementation capacity and strong political 
commitment to transition, all of which created a highly favorable context.  As a middle income 
country with an existing national program already implementing targeted interventions at a 
national level, India had significant advantages in having a large resource base to finance 
additional programming and prior experience implementing “targeted interventions” for key 
populations, which additionally contributed to the feasibility of transition in the Avahan case.  
Indeed, Avahan has been largely viewed as a successful transition.
26,30
 A significant portion of 
implementing organizations were re-contracted by NACO and continued implementing targeted 
interventions following the norms of the NACP; 
26
 additional management structures, known as 
Technical Support Units (TSUs) were included within NACP guidelines to facilitate continued 
investment in program management;
26




distribution outcomes were comparable or better in the initial years following transition.
31,32
  
While perhaps an exceptional case of transition, the Avahan experience offers valuable insight 
into not only the level of service continuity that is possible with significant planning, resources, 
and commitment, but at the same time, the types of programmatic changes that may be especially 
difficult to avoid, despite extensive planning and investment. This work explores the latter by 
investigating challenges of aligning the approach of the Avahan initiative to the national system, 
the changes to Avahan programming that resulted, and the extent to which these changes may 
present potential threats to sustaining Avahan’s long-term impact.   
Methods 
One author (AP) conducted 22 in-depth interviews with key informants representing the 
perspectives of both the Avahan Initiative (BMGF and SLP informants) and NACP (NACO, 
SACS, and TSU informants) (Table 1).   Of note, multiple TSU informants had prior experience 
working with programs outside of the government system.  One informant included here had 
previously worked for Avahan, and others came from the private sector or had past experience 
with donors and thus represent a view not uniquely “government.”  However, informants from 
TSUs were designated as representing the “NACP” side of transition given their role of assisting 
with implementation of NACP and familiarity with the operations of the government system.  
Key informants were purposively selected to provide perspectives from two different geographic 
areas, Andhra Pradesh, a Southern state where programming focused primarily on FSWs and 
MSMs and where transition was completed relatively smoothly in three rounds spanning 2009-
2012, and Manipur and Nagaland in the Northeast states, where programming focused on IDUs 
and transition occurred later from 2012-13, with less preparation time than in the South.  
Interviews were conducted in English at multiple sites in Delhi, Hyderabad, and Guwahati, India 
between April and June 2013.  This timing coincided with the conclusion of transitions in the 




years after the first round of transitions.  Informants were thus able to reflect on the transition in 
retrospect yet still have relatively recent experience to inform their responses.  Interviews were 
open-ended and followed an interview guide exploring the types of changes experienced during 
alignment process and the ways in which informants felt they might negatively influence the 
long-term sustainability of the reduction in HIV incidence.  Interviews were transcribed by the 
researcher.  Initial coding was applied according to categories of the interview guide, including 
the challenges of transitioning to the national program and types of programmatic changes.  A 
second round of pattern coding
33
 identified relationships between the challenges of alignment 
during transition and resulting changes to Avahan programming.  The perspectives of key 
informants with respect to the magnitude of threats presented by transition-related changes were 
summarized using qualitative content analysis.
34
    
Table 1: Key Informant Characteristics 
 
Stakeholder Perspective N Region Program Affiliation 
BMGF 6 Multi-state Avahan 
State Lead Partners 10 South (n=5) 
Northeast (n=5) 
Avahan 
Government of India 2 South (n=1) 
National(n=1) 
NACP 









Key informants identified three challenges of aligning the Avahan and NACP programs prior 
to transition.  Relative to Avahan, NACP had lower costing structures, limited flexibility of 
budgeting and implementation practices, and limited technical expertise in implementing 




costings were related to aligning operational norms; the challenges related to limited flexibility 
and expertise with community mobilization and empowerment were reflective of changes in the 
general nature of the national system compared to Avahan.  These challenges, either together or 
independently, contributed to four programmatic changes that were perceived by informants as 
presenting potential threats to the long-term sustainability of Avahan’s impact: 1) reduced 
investment in program management 2) interruptions in context-specific activities 3) heightened 
barriers to innovation and data-driven change 4) diminished support for community mobilization 
and empowerment activities (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Relationship Between Programmatic Changes and Challenges of Alignment 
 










Reduced investment in program 
management 
    
Interruptions in context-specific activities      
Heightened barriers to innovation and 
date-driven change 
     
Diminished support for community 
mobilization and empowerment activities 
      
   
 
 Reduced investment in program management.  One change directly related to the lower 
costing structure was the change in the resources allocated to program management.  About half 
of informants including Avahan (n=6) and NACP informants (n=4) described reductions in the 
investment in program management post-transition, and particularly the human resources 
allocated for program management.  Informants from both the South and Northeast described the 
struggle that the management personnel within SACS experienced in supporting the additional 
implementing organizations post-transition. One informant from government explained: 
“.. post transition, see, as the number of [NGOs] has increased, the burden is up more.  For example, I 




And at the same time, the human resources should also be increased…  I feel that there should be some 
more hands in the program, and [Joint Directors] they can be – assistant directors.  Because the program 
has expanded.  And now in fact we work for 16 hours.” – #7 NACP   
 
Informants varied with respect to their perception of the magnitude of this threat to 
sustainability.  Avahan informants described that BMGF continued to support additional 
management capacity post-transition by funding TSUs in some states, which assisted government 
with techno-managerial needs, and also offered additional human capital for a limited period post 
transition, but this was not an indefinite commitment.   
Avahan informants expressed some concern that the reduced investment in management 
relative to Avahan might lower quality over time, but that this threat might be mitigated by the 
timing of transition, which coincided with an increasingly controlled state of the HIV epidemic.   
As one informant from Avahan explained:   
“I think that [the investment in management] was needed at the time when the program was scaling 
up; now we’re in a different mode – [the next phase] is more about maintaining and you may not need the 
same intensity of effort …  The management capacity they fund at a lower level than we would like, but you 
don’t win all battles.  And at least now the need is slightly less, you could say.  It would have been bad if 
they didn’t want to support that in the first five years of scale-up, but now I think genuinely there is a 
maintenance mode, which might need less intensity.“  –#19 Avahan 
 
From the government side, one informant recognized that the larger investment in 
management by Avahan had some value, yet suggested it was difficult to determine how large an 
investment in management was necessary to maintain quality: 
“Now, it’s a question of judgment call - you pay well you get good quality.  You pay a little less you may 
get a lesser quality person, because skills are scarce.  Now whether it was worth that much of money that 
they [BMGF] were paying…it’s the management [level] which matters, and they paid hugely.…So it’s all 
a question of,  ‘How can you get a similar outcome at the lowest cost?’  That’s very challenging.  And if 
anyone comes and says, ‘Look, I’ve got the same outcome at the lowest cost,’ the government will just 
jump into it.  But that’s not what happens in reality.  In reality they come with these very nice fancy 
models with huge amount of things and huge costs…..” -#5 NACP 
 
Although recognizing the lower allocation in management relative to Avahan, NACP 
informants did not articulate concern that having fewer management personnel had lowered 




Thus, the investment in management was a change resulting from the lower resource 
allocation to management supported under NACP.  However, there was some uncertainty about 
the extent to which it had negative consequences for program quality in the long-term.  There was 
recognition on both the Avahan and the NACP sides of transition that program management 
resources were reduced post transition. At the same time, the long-term impact of this change was 
potentially mitigated by the lower demands of program maintenance vs. scale-up, and by having 
existing staff absorb additional duties.    
Interruptions in context specific-activities.  In addition to the differences in costing 
structures, key informants described NACP as having limited flexibility with respect to budgeting 
and implementation, which was associated with interruptions in the delivery of activities that 
were tailored to a specific program location, or context-specific activities.  More than half of 
informants including both Avahan (n=10) and NACP informants (n = 3)  commented on limited 
ability to continue practices specialized for the contexts in which Avahan worked.  In both the 
Northeast and the South, transition resulted in a disruption to aspects of programming that were 
either not included within or differed from the existing operational norms of the government 
program.  These included modified staffing ratios for areas with disparate populations of end-
users, specialized service delivery approaches for hard-to-reach populations, and populations with 
specialized needs, for example, female IDUs.   
Transition in the Northeast coincided with the end of several pilot projects testing new 
strategies designed to increase coverage in the rural setting of the IDU-driven epidemic in the 
Northeast.   Avahan piloted a number of initiatives, including interventions targeted specifically 
to female IDUs, nurse-led STI testing to increase access in the absence of doctors, and rotating 
drop-in centers between multiple physical locations spread out over a larger area.  Although 
effective, all informants from the Northeast (n=7) commented on challenges of continuing these 
activities after transition given that they diverged from the NACP implementation norms.  While 




in budgeting and implementation limited the extent to which these were supported post-transition.  
Although negotiations for the adoption of these approaches into the next phase of NACP were on-
going at the time of data collection, these strategies were not integrated into NACP guidelines 
prior to transition and their continuation was subject to interruption.  Informants from the 
Northeast described NACO as generally receptive to the possibility of supporting effective, 
context-specific practices, but nevertheless constrained by the challenges of supporting variations 
from the standard norms for the rest of the country.  All of the informants who described the 
challenges of continuing context-specific activities viewed it negatively.  
In the South, Avahan programming deviated from the NACP norms in having more 
designated clinics for key populations and flexible ratios of peer educators per key population in 
order to accommodate the more disparate concentration of individuals in rural areas.  To 
accommodate NACP budgetary and operational norms, Avahan-supported implementers began 
referring key populations from Avahan clinics to government clinics or preferred provider clinics, 
which changed the physical service location for key populations.  Avahan informants in the South 
indicated that this sometimes increased the distance that key populations traveled to access 
services.  Additionally, the ratio of peer educators to key populations was reduced in some 
instances in order to align with NACP norms, which was described by Avahan informants as 
adding additional burden to peer educators working in rural areas where key populations are 
farther apart.  In both the Northeast and the South, the limited continuation of these context-
specific approaches after transition changed the way in which services were delivered to rural 
populations, and some informants perceived these as threats to the extent that they may have 
contributed to additional burdens for end-users in accessing services in rural areas.    
Heightened barriers to innovation and data-driven change.   The combination of a lower 
costing structure and more limited flexibility within NACP additionally contributed to the 
perception of heightened barriers to innovation and data-driven change post-transition. Nearly 




ability to pilot new approaches, engage in innovation, and ultimately use data to adapt and 
improve the quality of implementation.  Engaging in research and implementing new, effective 
approaches required both dedicated resources for research and the flexibility to rapidly change 
program practices based on evidence, both of which were perceived as limited within the 
government system.  As one government informant from NACP explained, it was not that 
innovation was impossible or absent within the government system, but was nonetheless 
perceived as difficult to continue without some continued support from donors:  
“I think, dialogue with donors, and academics, and others outside, those who are directly involved in 
implementation is absolutely critical because this program will die the day they stop innovating….This is 
where the donors can play when they come with a bit of money.  What happens typically in government is, 
first of all, money is tight, and you are literally keeping your head above water and trying to fund what is 
essential. …It’s not that [innovation] is not there –this place is full of innovation – but that we should keep 
apart some budget , that we must do operations research , that we must try and encourage innovation, must 
give models – that area is slow in coming” – #5 NACP    
 
The reduced budget and flexibility for continued innovation and change was described as a 
particular concern in the Northeast, where maintaining the effectiveness of program activities 
required frequent change, as one informant explained, 
“..one thing that we tried to do quite a bit is that we allow the NGOs to be able to monitor the trends 
and the change that they see along in their data.  And, also change our program according to that.  So that 
flexibility sometimes is very difficult in a government set up because you have like, one set of guidelines 
and you all fall under it. So, for example, in drug use – drug use is never the same.  The trend keeps 
changing, depending on the availability – very dynamic and unless you change yourself according to the 
trend, your program can become very irrelevant.” – #14 Avahan  
 
Even in the South, where the epidemic has largely stabilized among FSW, MSM, TG 
populations, having the budget and flexibility to innovate was seen as important to remain 
effective through changes in the risk environment.  Informants from Avahan described changes in 
the typology of sex work, shifting from street-based to mobile-phone based solicitation, which 
required new approaches to prevention.  While some states were able to continue to fund 
operations research without relying on donor resources, all six of the informants discussing the 




made it more difficult for government to support opportunities for continual research and 
implement changes related to quality improvement without continued support from donors.   
Diminished support for community mobilization and empowerment activities.  A third 
challenge in transitioning Avahan programming to the national program related to differences in 
the existing technical capacity to support community mobilization and empowerment 
interventions.  Combined with the reduced investment in management and limited flexibility, 
limited technical capacity contributed to changes in support for community mobilization and 
empowerment activities.  More than half of informants, including Avahan informants (n=10) and 
NACP informants (n=4) described diminished support for community mobilization and 
empowerment activities post-transition.  This manifested in a number of ways, including a lapse 
in routine monitoring of indicators related to community mobilization, diminished budgetary 
support for food, tea and incentives offered at drop-in centers, loss of funds for community 
outreach events, and limited flexibility within the budget for implementing organizations to fund 
these types of activities at their discretion.  While still communicating support for strengthening 
community-based organizations, one informant from government acknowledged it as a lower 
priority: 
“NACO encourages CBOs but the first priority is the program…The thing is you grow - the CBOs, you 
grow.  But at the same time, don’t forget the program – HIV prevention, STI prevention.” - #7 NACP 
 
While not all informants offered explanations for this difference in focus, those that did 
varied in their explanations of why this occurred.  While a few Avahan informants perceived 
these community-oriented activities to be valued less by government than biomedical ones (n=2), 
there were also informants from both Avahan (n=2) and NACP (n=2) who perceived the 
diminished focus on community-oriented activities as a combined consequence of NACP having 
insufficient resources, flexibility, and technical expertise to be able to support the management 
intensive, complex nature of the interventions, as one informant explained: 
“…and probably because of the sheer managerial support that the Avahan program could actually 




about what crisis-management is, I think it’s essentially, it boils down to the budgets and the money that is 
available.  So, when you are talking about crisis management – how do you mobilize the police, and the 
municipal and the elite?  These are urban and peri-urban programs so, how do you mobilize these key 
stakeholders and get them involved?  And this costs money.  Probably, I am not sure, probably they have 
more flexibility in financing these to the NGOs than the government.” – #3 NACP 
 
Further, at the time of transition, one informant highlighted that the government system was 
not technically prepared to support these interventions at the time of transition, explaining:  
“I don’t know how far it is feasible to the government or not.  But positioning a specialist at the 
[NGO] level or the government level who would handle that community mobilization aspect.  As I told 
earlier this is one area where government is not very comfortable doing that.  They don’t have the 
resources, number one, and they don’t have skills also.  This is something different ballgame for them.  If 
donors can negotiate with NACO and then SACS and try for a position in SACS which can handle this 
process there, I think that’s going to continue the program. “ – #8 NACP 
 
  Separate from perceptions about the level of support for community-oriented activities post 
transition, many Avahan informants (n=10) and some NACP informants (n=3) emphasized the 
importance of continued community strengthening for long-term sustainability.  In the Northeast, 
community mobilization activities were viewed as critical for assisting IDUs in realizing 
alternative life prospects, as one informant explained: 
“ …this is what will make or break a long-term sustainability of programs… [The IDU community’s] 
involvement in service is one thing, but on the other when you look specifically at communities like IDUs, 
the only thing that they have in common is that they inject…. but once they come on to OST or once they 
switch on to another kind of drug, other livelihood options and all this open up for them…So, actually we 
talked about community mobilization, it’s not just the NGO services and mobilization, it’s helping a 
community get back on their feet, isn’t it?  So it’s a long process.  But it is so very essential.  And it all 
starts with mobilizing the communities because it opens up their eyes in a different perspective: from a 
sense of hopelessness to something of hope.”- #11 Avahan 
 
In the South, community mobilization and empowerment activities were viewed by Avahan 
informants as key in allowing key population communities to become independent organizations 
capable of advocating for their rights and addressing their own needs.  While this was a more 
ambitious goal than continued engagement in the Northeast, it was seen as feasible given the 
existing capacity of communities, albeit not nearly complete at the time of transition.  As one 




“…for many CBOs, although we organized them into community based organizations, the ownership 
has not yet come to the level that we would like them to.  That means, this program is our program.  We 
need to make sure that the communities are healthy…For us we need to do.  That ownership has not yet 
really ingrained into the communities also.  They see that it is a program, which is a program.  But not 
necessarily that it is there for themselves.” – #10 Avahan 
 
Avahan informants explained that although BMGF had committed additional support for 
community mobilization activities for one year post-transition, they remained concerned that it 
would not be sufficient to ensure communities remained motivated, engaged, and empowered to 
protect themselves from risk of HIV.  Thus, diminished support for community mobilization and 
empowerment activities was perceived as a significant threat to sustainability in retaining demand 
for HIV prevention services and, ultimately, sustained behavior change in key population 
communities.   
 Discussion 
These findings offer insight into the challenges involved in transitioning a donor-funded 
program delivered through a parallel system to an existing publicly funded program delivered 
through a national public health system.  Key informants on both the Avahan and NACP “sides” 
of transition described challenges arising from the lower costing structure, more limited 
flexibility of budgeting and implementation, and limited technical expertise with community 
empowerment activities within NACP.  These challenges were associated with programmatic 
changes including lower investment in program management, interruptions in the delivery of 
context-specific activities, heightened barriers to innovation and data-driven change, and 
diminished support for community mobilization and empowerment activities.   While there was 
high consensus on the ways in which the program changed, not all changes were perceived to 
present similar magnitude of threat to sustaining reductions in HIV incidence long-term. 
These findings corroborate changes in budget, flexibility and community-oriented activities 
identified through evaluations of the Avahan transition
31,32




interpretation of these changes by illuminating the nature of the challenges and the perceived 
significance of different types of changes. 
This study benefitted from perspectives of key informants from both Avahan and NACP, but 
has several limitations with respect to the views it reflects.  Although multiple stakeholder groups 
were included, this study does not represent the perspectives of those involved in frontline 
implementation.  This was a deliberate omission in aiming to reach informants with an 
overarching perspective on the challenges of transitioning to the national system and potential 
threats to long-term sustainability, yet it may under-represent programmatic changes that were 
more acutely experienced by stakeholders on the frontline of implementation, and misrepresent 
the perceived magnitude of threat presented by these changes.  A complementary study of key 
population experience of transition offers additional insight in how these changes were 
experienced at the frontline, particularly the diminished support for community empowerment 
interventions.
35
   Further, although none of the changes described here were unique to either 
Avahan or NACP perspectives, the majority of key informants represented perspectives from the 
“Avahan side” of transition, and several informants affiliated here with NACP had prior 
experience working with Avahan and deep familiarity with Avahan implementation.  It is 
possible that these findings under-represent the diversity of views that may be held by those on 
the “receiving” side of transition.  The changes and potential threats to sustainability identified in 
this work are thus examples of possible changes and threats to sustainability, but in no way 
exhaustive or definitive of the ways in which transitioning from a parallel, donor-supported 
system to a national system may present threats to sustainability.  Finally, as acknowledged 
earlier, the Avahan transition experience had many contextual factors that may not be mirrored in 
other transition settings.  Avahan was distinct with respect to its large resource base, flexibility, 
and tailored community approaches; India similarly represents a specific context of being a 
middle-income country with a particularly large and heterogeneous population, and a national 




the Avahan experience has multiple implications for future transitions in less exceptional 
contexts.  
Avahan initially sought to achieve high impact quickly and was designed with the purpose of 
scale-up, investing as needed to fill gaps in capacity and coverage of the national public health 
system.  These findings suggest that even when there have been significant investments in 
capacity building and systems strengthening prior to transition, it may not be possible to 
transition programs developed through a parallel, donor-supported system without first adapting 
the program to “fit” within the constraints of the host country health system.  Other programs that 
have been developed through donor-supported parallel systems, like many PEPFAR programs, 
may experience challenges with respect to transitioning to national delivery systems. 
While Avahan had high financial allocations for program management that exceeded those of 
India’s relatively well financed program, more modest programs may require even greater down-
sizing in order to fit within the tighter budgetary constraints of lower income countries.  Given 
concerns for internal “brain drain” and existing challenges retaining highly skilled personnel 
within the public system,
24,36-38
 aligning donor-supported initiatives to the budgetary constraints 
of publicly financed programs may similarly reduce availability of human resources, and 
management personnel may be an additional cadre that is particularly hard to retain in the public 
sector.   
Similarly, the challenges related to flexibility may have been exacerbated by Avahan’s high 
flexibility, while India is a particularly large and diverse country that may require a greater level 
of standardization than smaller, more homogenous countries.  However, there may be still be 
discrepancies in flexibility between less flexible donor-supported initiatives and national systems 
in other contexts when transition involves shifting from a specialized focus on specific sub-
populations or geographic areas to programs that cater to a broader, more heterogeneous 




require a level of standardization that could result in disruptions of activities tailored to 
populations with specialized needs.     
Finally, although NACP had prior experience implementing programs for key populations in 
a concentrated epidemic, the differential expertise with biomedical interventions compared to 
community mobilization and empowerment interventions suggests that even programs that share 
a broadly similar focus may support different activities, and thus may require extended efforts in 
capacity building and technical support for unfamiliar types of interventions. 
The Avahan experience additionally points to several possible roles donors can continue to 
support post-transition that may mitigate potential threats to sustainability.   For example, the one 
year period of post-transition support offered by BMGF temporarily extended support for 
community mobilization activities to at least delay and potentially mitigate negative 
consequences of having diminished support for these activities under NACP.  While these 
findings suggest that a limited period of post-transition support may not be sufficient to eliminate 
threats to long-term sustainability, continuing donor support for some time after transition may be 
important to prevent and to some extent minimize negative effects of change in other transition 
settings.     
Further, the Avahan experience suggests that reconciling differences in financial resources 
represents only part of the challenge of sustaining program impact through transitions to in-
country health systems.  While NACO could potentially have mobilized and allocated more 
resources towards management, and with extended planning, some of the context-specific 
activities of the Northeast may have been adopted prior to transition, preventing changes related 
to flexibility may be more difficult to address.  Donors and other actors with more flexible 
resource commitments may be needed to support operations research and innovation for programs 
working in highly variable risk environments that stretch the limits of a standardized approach to 




respect to the process of scale-up,
39
 yet this work suggests that flexibility and adaptation may also 
be relevant considerations for sustaining impact after scale up.     
Technical expertise for interventions addressing social risk factors, such as the community 
mobilization and empowerment activities supported by Avahan, may be a further area for 
continued donor support.  Despite sharing a focus on targeted interventions for high-risk groups, 
NACP had limited experience implementing community mobilization and empowerment 
activities, relying on continued support from BMGF to continue community strengthening 
activities.  While one could argue that transition simply occurred before sufficient capacity-
building for these sorts of interventions had occurred, it is also possible that the complex, cross-
sectoral nature of community mobilization and empowerment interventions 
40
 requires greater 
flexibility and coordination than institutions with an HIV-focused mandate can take on alone.  
PEPFAR’s experience transitioning some responsibilities for orphans and vulnerable children 
programming, which, like the community empowerment activities can involve working across 
multiple sectors to address social and economic risk factors, has shown that building relationships 
across multiple social sectors can be beneficial.
41
 Donors may have opportunity to enhance the 
sustainability of these interventions by making efforts to identify diverse sets of actors with 
complementary skills who may share an interest in supporting these activities and building 
relationships between these actors prior to transition.  
At the same time, while there was high consensus among the informants with respect to the 
challenges of transitioning from Avahan to the government implementation system and the 
resulting programmatic changes, the variability in the magnitude of the perceived threat 
associated with these changes suggests that some changes may be more important to avoid than 
others.  Of the changes reported here, the ones provoking the greatest concern from informants 
were the limited flexibility to adapt activities in response to contextual changes, and the limited 




were seen as threats to long-term sustainability: the former by compromising the ability to remain 
effective for populations with specialized needs and through changes in the risk environment that 
occur over time, and the latter by undermining the demand-generation aspect of programming 
that would keep service utilization high.  These concerns suggest several possible implications for 
long-term consequences of programmatic changes following transition: 1) it may be that these 
types of changes are significant threats to long-term sustainability and their consequences on HIV 
outcomes are not yet apparent, or 2)  it may be that while these changes have some negative 
consequences for program quality and demand for services, the consequences are not strong 
enough to threaten the sustainability of long-term outcomes.  This uncertainty makes it 
particularly challenging to determine whether specific changes in a particular context constitute 
threats to sustainability, and suggests it may be important to continue to monitor a wide variety of 
indicators post transition to determine whether the changes may have negative consequences in 
the long term.   
Measuring short-term output indicators, such as the measures of coverage and condom 
distribution for transitions of HIV prevention programming like that supported by the Avahan 
Initiative, does not indicate other potentially significant outcomes of transition, for example, 
whether the same individuals are using services post transition as opposed to new individuals, 
whether skilled personnel stay in their positions post-transition, and whether previously 
marginalized individuals retain a greater agency in the promotion of their own well-being. 
Indicators reporting on user-retention, social stigma, health worker turnover, and individual 
behavioral indicators, for example, may capture some of the potential changes of transition that 
may not be immediately evident in short-term output indicators.  For programs with interventions 
addressing social and economic risk factors, such as the community mobilization and 
empowerment activities supported under Avahan, these types of indicators may be especially 





Moreover, the perspectives of key informants from the Avahan transition suggest that in 
order to understand whether transition will introduce programmatic changes that may undermine 
sustainability, it is necessary to first understand how the program being transitioned fits within 
the context of the epidemic and the capacity of the existing health delivery system.  In contexts 
where epidemics are uncontrolled and risk environment dynamic, transitioning to government 
systems may have significant consequences for quality and impact, which could be mitigated by 
transitioning at a later point in the evolution of an epidemic.  It has been argued that the 
determination of when to reintegrate programs with national health systems is context dependent, 
and should include considerations of feasibility, as well as the existence of clear plans to manage 
integration and ensure continued monitoring and evaluation to detect lapses in quality or 
performance that occur in the process.
42
   
In contexts where community empowerment remains low, changes in community 
mobilization activities and demand-generating activities generally may present more significant 
challenges to continued utilization and similarly constitute a persistent threat to sustainability of 
impact.  While potentially more complex  and with longer time horizons than biomedical 
interventions, the perspectives of informants in this case would suggest that continuing to support 
community empowerment activities and interventions that address structural risk factors is 
critically important to sustaining gains in HIV prevention within marginalized and vulnerable 
populations.  
Ultimately, this work suggests that prior to any transition, it will be important to consider 
which aspects of a program are critical to its effectiveness, and the extent to which they fit within 
the constraints of the system to which it is transitioned.  Recognizing the ways in which aligning 
with host-country systems is likely to induce change in the program can help inform a process of 
“down-sizing” or “right-sizing” in a way that limits the introduction of changes that potentially 
undermine sustainability.  While it may not be possible to fully understand how programs will 




facilitate discussion of the realistic outcomes of transition and the identification of a transition 
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Paper 3: A responsible exit: exploring the normative basis of donor agency 




This article considers the ethical responsibilities relevant to donor exit, the process through 
which donor agencies end support for health and development programs.  Motivated by a real-
world case example, this article identifies vulnerability to threats to basic well-being as one 
morally relevant feature of donor exit.  This article critically considers two normative theories 
that may support the premise that donor agencies are in part responsible for ensuring that threats 
to the basic well-being of end-users that have been averted by donor-supported programs remain 
averted after exit.  Leif Wenar’s Least Cost Theory is argued to provide a compelling basis for 
distributing responsibilities in the context of exit.  Drawing from a real-world case example of 
donor exit, the practical implications of applying the Least Cost Theory are explored.  The 
argument concludes with preliminary recommendations for donor agencies seeking to discharge 
their responsibilities prior to exit by empowering host country actors to effectively avert threats to 

























Long-term sustainability of the benefits produced by health and development aid is a 
prominent concern in global health, particularly with respect to HIV prevention, care, and 
treatment.  While donor investments in HIV prevention and control increased rapidly from 2003-
2011, funding has remained stagnant or slightly decreased in recent years,
1,2
 raising concern for 
the consequences of diminished donor support.
2-6
  While the scale and gravity of the HIV 
epidemic has brought heightened attention to the challenges of sustainability and possible harms 
of diminishing donor resources, HIV is not unique in experiencing variable levels of support.  All 
donor-supported programs are ultimately finite endeavors making the practice of ending effective 
programs a routine occurrence in both global and domestic health work. Yet despite the eventual 
necessity of ending support, the ethical implications of declining donor investments have been 
relatively little explored in global health and normative literature.    
In global health the process of withdrawing resources from a programming context is known 
as donor exit.  While there are multiple sets of “best practices” for exit,
7-10
 they are generally 
recommendations for facilitating exit with little to no consideration of the ethical aspects of exit.  
Although many practitioners characterize exit as a difficult and sometimes painful process,
10
 there 
is little guidance to inform what it means to exit well and what responsibilities global health 
funders owe to the populations their programs serve. 
Within political and moral philosophy there are many potential accounts of responsibility that 
may inform guidance around the practice of exit, yet it is not obvious what the nature of donors’ 
responsibilities would be.  Accounts of global justice have discussed the responsibility of global 
actors, including governments, donor agencies, or other international institutions in the context of 
responsibility to initiate aid, with no clear consensus on either the scope or magnitude of 
responsibility for any global actor, much less international donor agencies specifically.
11
  Further, 




process of supporting aid projects, thus leaving unclear what might be required of them before 
ending an engagement in which they have achieved some benefit.  Similarly, normative accounts 
of beneficence have been applied to understand the content and limit of the general 
responsibilities that individuals have to aid the global poor,
12
 yet are also subject to debate.  Many 
have argued that the extension of a general duty of beneficence to the global poor is simply too 
demanding to reasonably require of individual actors
13
 and seems duly considered supererogatory 
or extending beyond what is morally required.   Human rights frameworks offer an alternative 
frame to consider donor responsibilities, yet rights-based approaches to health are concerned with 
creating conditions in which states can fulfill their responsibilities to their citizens for the 
fulfillment of basic human rights rather than the responsibilities of specific donor agents.
14
   
In the absence of a clear theoretical approach to understanding responsibilities related to exit, 
this work instead begins with a premise inspired by a real word case example of donor exit and 
then looks to normative literature to identify a moral basis to support the premise.  By identifying 
an approach that is consistent with the empirical premise and has theoretical support, this work 
seeks to provide a normative basis for the development of ethically informed practical guidance 
for donor exit. 
This paper is constructed in three parts. Section 1 begins with the moral intuition of an 
informant from a donor agency with respect to a real-world example of donor exit.  This section 
argues that the morally relevant feature of donor exit is the vulnerability of end-user populations 
that arises from being dependent upon others for the continued provision of services that 
effectively avert threats to their basic well-being.  Framing donor exit in this way takes as a 
starting point that there unequivocally exists a responsibility to protect vulnerable populations 
from threats to their basic well-being, and it points the normative analysis toward approaches of 
allocating responsibilities to avert threats to basic well-being among multiple actors potentially in 




 Section 2 draws from the normative literature on distributing responsibilities to identify an 
approach consistent with the premise that donor agencies are in part responsible for ensuring that 
threats to the basic well-being of end-users that have been averted by donor-supported programs 
remain averted after exit.  Through critical examination of multiple approaches to distributing 
responsibility, this section argues that Leif Wenar’s Least-Cost Theory offers a compelling basis 
for the premise above.   
Section 3 considers the challenges of translating the Least-Cost Theory into practice drawing 
from the case example of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)’s experience with the 
Avahan-The India AIDS Initiative to clarify the content of donor responsibilities in the context of 
exit.  The paper concludes with an initial set of action-guiding recommendations for donors 
seeking to discharge their responsibilities prior to exit.   
Section 1:  The Moral Relevance of Vulnerability 
This work is motivated by a real-world example of a BMGF funded project called Avahan- 
The India AIDS Initiative, which supported HIV prevention activities for high risk populations of 
female sex workers (FSW), men who have sex with men (MSM), transgendered persons (TG), 
and injection drug users (IDUs) in six states in India.  BMGF focused on scaling up effective HIV 
prevention interventions in the first phase of implementation (2004-2008).
15
 The second phase of 
implementation (2008-2013) engaged in a concerted effort to transfer the financing and 
management aspects of an HIV prevention program to the government and have it continue under 
the existing National AIDS Control Program.
16
  The Avahan case represents a particular type of 
exit in which the donor agency, BMGF, sought to transfer the responsibility for continued 
program implementation to host-country actors in order to sustain the benefits that the program 
offered to high risk populations after the cessation of BMGF support.  During an interview with 
an informant from BMGF, it was suggested that transition was motivated at least in part by a 




“… it wouldn’t be the right thing to just build a program and then just leave.  Because then you’ve 
actually, while you may have had impact in terms of the aversion of deaths and you know more AIDS cases, 
you’ve also got an entire community, you know, dependent on a roster of services that are critical for their 
health and their life…” – Donor informant 
 
The above quotation suggests that the cause for moral concern in this case was the 
dependency of the communities that the program served on the continuation of these services.  
The context of donor exit could thus be characterized as one of vulnerability in the sense that the 
end-user communities are dependent on the actions of others for the continuation of services that 
avert threats to their basic well-being.  Goodin defines vulnerability as a matter of being under 
threat of harm, and argues that the matter of vulnerability is indifferent to the cause of potential 
harms.
17p(110) He suggests that vulnerability can arise either from manmade or natural threats, and 
that people are vulnerable to harms that come about through the omissions of others just as well 
as they are vulnerable to harms that arise through positive actions.
17(p100) Dependency is identified 
as an example of vulnerability to harm that may arise from inaction rather than action.
17(p110)   
Understood this way, it is the community’s vulnerability to potential threats to health and basic 
well-being that may arise in the absence of donor support that gives rise to moral responsibility.   
Indeed, approaching donor exit through the lens of vulnerability appears more defensible than 
alternative framings.  Viewed through the lens of beneficence, the provision of aid – even the 
language of “donor” – suggests a voluntary act of good will.  That a donor informant would 
express a moral concern (i.e. doing the right thing) in the process of exit would suggest it could 
be morally wrong to stop engaging in a non-obligatory act of assistance even after having a great 
deal of positive impact.  This is, at least to some, a counterintuitive claim.  While some theorists 
have argued that engaging in a non-obligatory act of assistance can and often does create 
additional responsibilities to do more to help,
18
 it is not obvious that continuing to finance 
services that ultimately protect vulnerable populations from harm is one such additional 
responsibility.  The notion that international donor agencies would take on this additional 




because it runs counter to widely held claims in “statist” conceptions of global justice that argue 




Yet, if the responsibilities relevant to exit are understood as responsibilities for protecting 
end-user populations from harms to basic well-being, the issue in the context of donor exit is not 
whether the end-user communities ought to be provided with the services they need to protect 
themselves from the risk of HIV and related threats.  Theories of global justice, duties of general 
beneficence, and human rights all agree that individuals ought to be protected from threats to 
basic well-being.  The normative question relevant to donor exit is rather who, of many possible 
actors, holds responsibility to ensure that these individuals are protected from threats to basic 
well-being?   
The remainder of this paper takes steps toward resolving this question.  In the following 
sections, the morally relevant feature of exit is taken to be the vulnerability of the individuals 
served by donor-supported disease prevention programs to threats to basic well-being, and the 
objective of the analysis is to understand whether and to what extent donor agencies are 
responsible for protecting the vulnerability of the end-user populations by ensuring that the 
threats to basic well-being that have been averted by their programs remain averted after exit.  
As a disclaimer, this approach to donor responsibilities does not preclude the existence of 
additional responsibilities that donor agencies may have arising from other moral concerns.  For 
instance, while this argument considers the circumstances in which donors may have 
responsibilities to continue to protect end-user populations from threats to basic well-being in 
contexts where end-users are dependent on donors for the aversion of such threats, it is also 
possible that donor agencies would have additional responsibilities to compensate for harms 
produced through their actions, and potentially other responsibilities.  The scope of this argument 
is confined to the subset of responsibilities arising from the dependency of end user populations 




Section 2: Characterizing Donor Exit as a Problem of Distributing Remedial 
Responsibilities and Defending the Least-Cost Theory of Allocating Responsibility  
 
This section considers the normative literature to identify an existing theory that would 
support the premise that donor agencies are in part responsible for ensuring that threats to the 
basic well-being of end-users that have been averted by donor-supported programs remain 
averted after exit.    
There are several background features of the context of donor exit that are important to keep 
in mind when considering the normative basis for this premise.  First, in any developing country 
context, there are many actors potentially in a position to provide services needed to ensure the 
basic well-being of vulnerable end-user communities.  Country governments, multiple 
international donors, international or domestic organizations involved in service delivery, front-
line service providers, and at-risk individuals themselves are all potential agents with some 
relationship to the vulnerable end-user communities that might give rise to responsibilities to 
protect them from harm.  Further, the populations in the Avahan case example were considered 
most at-risk populations, signaling the extent of their exposure to threat.  Many were considered 
to be at once economically poor, socially marginalized, and engaged in behavior patterns that put 
their health at risk.  Thus, the context is one in which the population regularly experiences threats 
to their basic well-being and in which there are multiple agents potentially in a position to avert 
them.  
In the normative literature, this context aligns with the problem of “remedial responsibilities” 
explained by David Miller in “Distributing Responsibility,”
21
 as well as Leif Wenar’s Least Cost 
Theory of assigning responsibility to avert threats to basic well-being described in “Responsibility 
and Severe Poverty.”
22
  Both Miller and Wenar are concerned with situations in which people are 
deprived of basic requirements for living decent lives and no one disputes that their situation 
ought to be remedied, but yet it remains unclear who is morally responsible for ensuring they are 




responsibility to a particular agent in the context of donor exit is conceptually similar to the 
problems motivating both Miller’s and Wenar’s approach to distributing responsibility.   
While there are many similarities in the arguments made by Miller and Wenar, they 
ultimately come to different conclusions; and as will be argued below, the Least-Cost Theory 
provides a more secure basis for the premise that donor agencies are in part responsible for 
ensuring that threats to the basic well-being of end-users that have been averted by donor-
supported programs remain averted after exit.   
Miller develops a theory to identify agents that hold remedial responsibility which he 
describes as follows: “...to be remedially responsible is to be picked out, either individually or 
along with others, as having responsibility toward the deprived or suffering party that is not 
shared equally among all agents.” 
21(p468)
  Miller develops the Connection Theory of distributing 
remedial responsibilities by systematically considering four principles he identifies as plausible 
candidates for guiding the assignment of responsibility: causal responsibility, which assigns 
responsibility on the basis of direct contribution to harm; moral responsibility, which assigns 
responsibility on the basis of indirect contribution to harm; capacity, which assigns responsibility 
on the basis of ability to remedy harm; and community, which assigns responsibility on the basis 
of the connection and history of interaction shared with the agent experiencing harm.
21
  He 
ultimately concludes that each of these principles may be appropriate in different settings and that 
none is appropriate for all settings; rather, the appropriate principle for assigning remedial 
responsibility will vary from case to case and should be determined by the strength of the 
relationship between actors and those in need.
21
  The Connection Theory therefore recognizes a 
plurality of principles that may assign responsibility by allowing for different principles to guide 
the assignment of responsibility in different cases.  Miller acknowledges that the principle that 




about which actors hold the strongest relationship, or “connection,” to the individuals under 
threat.
21
     
Wenar’s Least-Cost Theory, in contrast, argues that responsibility for averting threats to basic 
well-being should always be located in the agent who can most easily avert the harm, all things 
considered, which is described as the Least-Cost Theory to allocating responsibility.
22
 In order to 
see how this diverges from a simple adoption of Miller’s capacity principle, it is necessary to 
describe Wenar’s argument in more detail.  According to Wenar, the Least-Cost Theory aligns 
with everyday intuitions about how we assign responsibility to avert threats to basic well-being, 
and he develops his argument around several everyday examples.  As a general norm, he argues, 
competent adults are deemed responsible for protecting themselves from harm.  Where this is not 
possible, for example, in situations where adults interact with others and rely on them to refrain 
from inflicting harm, or where individuals are incapable of protecting themselves from harm, 
assignment of responsibility steps back to the agent who can most easily avert the harm.  Wenar 
develops examples using traffic laws, where responsibility is assigned to each driver to refrain 
from colliding with the car in front, and conventions of parental responsibilities that assign 
parents the responsibility to feed their children.  In this way, the least-cost approach can identify 
roles such as “drivers” or “parents” that have predictable responsibilities and thereby allow for 
easy assignment of responsibilities.
22
   
For predictable threats, such as those from known hazards, Wenar offers the concept of 
“systems of roles,” through which multiple actors are assigned different responsibilities on the 
basis of the role they are best situated to fill, and which, taken together, effectively avert threats to 
basic well-being.  The example Wenar develops to illustrate role responsibility is the way 
organized societies avert threats of fires: firefighters are in the role responsible for actually 
putting out fires, while government agents are assigned the role responsible for ensuring 




paying taxes to provide the resources for government to support firefighters.
22
  Thus, the system 
represents a distribution of responsibilities based on what each can do with least-cost, all things 
considered, representing the most efficient system that effectively prevents threats to basic well-
being.  A final element of the Least-Cost Theory is Wenar’s notion of primary and secondary 
responsibility.  While the Least-Cost Theory assigns responsibility first to the agent most 
proximal to the threat, so-called primary responsibility, the assignment of responsibility shifts to 
the next-most-proximal agent or role when the primary agent is either unwilling or unable to avert 
the threat.  This more distal agent then takes on secondary responsibility for averting harms to the 
individual under threat.  Wenar’s example of vulnerable children illustrates this concept: parents 
are assigned primary responsibility for protecting their children but when for whatever reason 
they do not, that responsibility shifts outward, to a family member, to their community, and 
eventually, if no agent can satisfactorily protect the child from harm, the responsibility falls to the 
state.
22
  Although the responsibility of these agents is secondary to that of parents, they are 
nonetheless responsible for the aversion of threat to basic well-being as the most proximal agent 
to the threat who is both willing and able to do so. Thus, like Miller’s Connection Theory, 
Wenar’s Least-Cost Theory places priority on assuring that the threat is actually averted by 
allowing responsibility to be assigned to more distal agents even if it is not their primary 
responsibility.   
Up until this point, it seems that both Miller’s Connection Theory and Wenar’s Least-Cost 
Theory could both support the original premise that donor agencies are in part responsible for 
ensuring that threats to the basic well-being of end-users that have been averted by donor-
supported programs remain averted after exit.  According to Miller, the capacity principle that 
connects donor agencies to the end-users their programs serve would have to be shown as the 
strongest connection from among others available in the setting - stronger than connections 




Connection Theory would support the premise that donor agencies have a responsibility to avert 
the threats to basic well-being for which they have the capacity to avert, essentially by continuing 
to provide the resources for effective programs.  Similarly, Wenar’s argument would assign such 
responsibility to donor agencies if it were the case that it would be easier for the donor to provide 
the resources necessary to effectively avert harms to basic well-being than for other agents.   
While both may seem reasonable arguments at first, further consideration of the two 
approaches shows how they begin to diverge.  While Miller acknowledges that in the case of 
immediate threats, the capacity principle ought to be applied to assign responsibility in order to 
ensure that those under threat of harm are “rescued,” he argues that in many remedial contexts, 
such as those of persistent poverty, the threat to well-being, while real, is not urgent in the same 
way as rescuing someone from a fire or drowning.
21(p468)
  Although those experiencing poverty 
are vulnerable to harm, intervention by a highly capable actor is unlikely to remedy the situation 
immediately.  Thus, Miller argues, in less urgent situations, it may be more appropriate to apply 
other principles, such as community or causal responsibility, and not default to the capacity 
principle to assign responsibility.  In this case, it would seem that donor exit is more similar to the 
less urgent scenario Miller has in mind: while the cessation of disease prevention program 
services may make end-users vulnerable to harm, their continuation will not alleviate such threats 
immediately– the risk is persistent and requires sustained investment. In such a case Miller’s 
Connection Theory might instead assign responsibility to other agents who have a stronger 
relationship based on another principle.  For example, it may assign responsibility to host-country 
governments, who, although in some cases are less capable than donor agencies to provide 
resources to continue services that effectively avert threats to well-being, may nonetheless by 
assigned remedial responsibility based on the strength of connection of shared nationality and 
community.  In a similar way, the community principle might be applied to assign some 
responsibility to the implementing agencies that are connected to the end-user communities 




it is recognized that these other actors may experience higher burden in protecting end-user 
vulnerabilities in light of their relatively lower capacity, Miller’s Connection Theory would 
accommodate arguments claiming that it would be justifiable to impose this burden based on the 
moral significance of their relationship.  
In contrast, Wenar’s Least-Cost Theory is unwilling to compromise capacity to avert threats 
to basic well-being in order to recognize the moral significance of other types of relationships 
between agents.  As Wenar’s “stepping back” mechanism of assigning responsibility makes clear, 
the overarching concern to ensure the threat is averted by an agent both willing and able to do so 
effectively, even if the agent in the position to avert the threat with least-cost may not have the 
strongest connection to those under threat.  Instead, the Least-Cost Theory has two ways in which 
agents with other meaningful relationships to those under threat may be assigned responsibility.  
First, the “system of roles” concept may distribute among multiple agents the various actions 
required to continue to avert a given threat.  So while donor agencies may have responsibility to 
continue to provide resources to support continued programming, for example, implementing 
agencies, who are connected to the end-user populations by a principle of community or shared 
experience, would have responsibilities to continue to deliver high quality services and engage in 
other activities that are more easily fulfilled by actors with a more proximal relationship to those 
under threat of harm.  Secondly, Wenar argues that the responsibilities assigned by the Least-Cost 
Theory can be discharged in one of two ways: direct aversion of threat; or, alternatively, 
empowering agents more proximal to the threat to be able to effectively avert it themselves, 
thereby transferring the responsibility towards the agents with primary responsibility to avert the 
threat.  This mechanism effectively limits the demandingness of donor responsibilities by not 
requiring them to avert threats to well-being indefinitely, and at the same time, creates an 
incentive for capacity-building and empowerment of more proximal actors that is absent from 




It is this notion of shifting responsibility inward by empowering more proximal actors that 
provides the more compelling basis for the premise that donor agencies are in part responsible for 
ensuring that threats to the basic well-being of end-users that have been averted by donor-
supported programs remain averted after exit.  The Connection Theory may or may not assign 
donors such responsibilities, and if it did, would require them to continue to support programming 
indefinitely, until the threat is averted.  However, the Least-Cost Theory allows donor agencies to 
discharge their responsibility through a process of capacity building, empowerment, and, if 
necessary, advocacy to ensure that more proximal actors are both able and willing to effectively 
protect the end-user populations from threats to basic well-being in the absence of continued 
donor support.  This process of discharging responsibility by empowering others essentially 
creates a system in which the least-cost distribution of responsibilities assigns responsibilities to 
host-country actors without having to “step back,” to use Wenar’s term, to donor agencies.  
Further, the Least-Cost Theory assigns responsibility based on the efficiency of the system of 
actors and limits undesirable outcomes of assigning the responsibilities to avert threats to basic 
well-being to agents that may not have capacity to fulfill effectively or without excessive burden, 
which may result from relying on the strength of relationships in Miller’s Connection Theory.  As 
a result, Wenar’s Least-Cost Theory of assigning responsibility to avert threats to basic well-
being offers the more compelling normative basis for the premise that donor agencies are in part 
responsible for ensuring that threats to the basic well-being of end-users that have been averted 
by donor-supported programs remain averted after exit.    
When operationalized in the context of exit, the Least Cost Theory would support the 
following argument: Donor agencies constitute a class of moral agents, or a ‘role’ in Wenar’s 
terms, that are assigned responsibilities to avert threats to basic well-being in international 
settings when more proximal actors are either unwilling or unable to do so.  When donor agencies 
are engaged in projects that effectively avert threats to basic well-being which are not being met 




those threats, and thereby take on responsibility to ensure that the individuals whom they are 
protecting from threats to basic well-being will remain protected from harm.  When preparing to 
exit from a programming engagement, donor agencies may discharge this responsibility by either 
averting the threat directly, or alternatively, by empowering more proximal actors to avert threats 
to well-being.  This effectively shifts responsibility inward toward the agents in the role with 
primary responsibility to avert the threats.  Exit, then, becomes ethically permissible when a new 
agent is sufficiently empowered to ensure that threats to well-being will not be reintroduced 
following the cessation of donor support. 
The next section takes steps towards developing action-guiding recommendations for donors 
seeking to exit in an ethically responsible way by raising and responding to some practical 
challenges of translating the least-coast approach into practice.  
Section 3: Practical Implications of Applying the Least-Cost Approach to Donor 
Exit 
 
This section discusses in greater depth the practical challenges and implications of 
operationalizing the Least-Cost Theory of assigning responsibility in the context of donor exit.  
We will consider four questions likely to arise in working towards action guiding 
recommendations for donor agencies:  
1. What counts as a threat to basic well-being? 
2. How might a donor identify which threats it is responsible for averting? 
3. If a donor seeks to discharge special responsibilities by empowering others, how can they 
determine which of the numerous more proximal actors they ought to empower? 
4. How would one know when a more proximal actor is sufficiently empowered to protect 
the vulnerability? 
Each question is followed by a general response and then contextualized using examples from 
the Avahan case, explained in detail elsewhere 
15,16
,  to further illustrate how the Least-cost 





1. What counts as a threat to basic well-being? 
Wenar’s least cost principle of assigning responsibility applies specifically to a certain class 
of threats he identifies as threats to basic well-being.  Taking the right to an adequate standard of 
living as his starting place, his concept of basic well-being is consistent with the notion that there 
are particular types of threats that are more serious, and more worthy of protection, than others.  
Yet Wenar offers no exhaustive or even exemplary list of such threats, leaving to other theorists 
the question of what constitutes a threat to basic well-being.  This question is addressed in two 
parts: first by discussing the practical interpretation of “basic well-being,” and then by 
considering what might constitute “threats to basic well-being.”  
Basic Well-Being: There are multiple existing normative accounts that may provide insight 
into the practical translation of “basic well-being,” in both human rights theory as well as social 
justice theory.   In The Idea of Human Rights, Beitz characterizes human rights as protections of 
“urgent individual interests” against standard threats to which individuals are vulnerable.
23(p109)
  
Beitz suggests that things like personal security and liberty, adequate nutrition, and protection 
against arbitrary use of state power would be considered urgent interests in that they are widely 
recognized as important to most lives; noting that not everyone needs to consider something an 
urgent interest, but that one ought to be able to understand why some would consider it urgent.  
Shue’s minimalistic concept of basic rights, which he defines as rights necessary for the 
enjoyment of other rights, gives similar priority to states of physical security, subsistence, and 
participation, including political participation.
24
 
Similarly, there is an emerging consensus in social justice theory suggesting that “well-being” 
is a multi-dimensional concept inclusive of multiple distinctively meaningful functions of life 
which may operate with varying levels of importance in any particular life.
25-27
  Taken together, 
these works offer significant support for understanding basic well-being as a composite measure 




respect, and attachments or affiliation with others.  The important implication for the context of 
donor exit is the notion that basic well-being includes more than a narrowly defined notion of 
“health.”   
Finally, the notion of “basic” also denotes that there is some distinction between basic well-
being and well-being broadly construed.  In their Twin Aim Theory, Power and Faden argue in 
favor of  “sufficiency” for each dimension of well-being.
25
  While they argue that sufficiency is 
context-dependent,
26(p60)
 the general notion is that basic well-being can be understood as having 
“enough” of each dimension of well-being such that overall well-being is sufficient for a decent 
life.  And while it is acknowledged that defining the exact threshold of sufficiency is very 
difficult in practice, there are many contexts in which it is clear that well-being is far below 
sufficiency, and these are often precisely those in which donor agencies work.   
Threats to Basic Well-Being.  Given the multi-dimensionality of basic well-being, threats to 
basic well-being would be constituted by policies, practices, and circumstances that undermine 
any dimension of basic well-being.  Risk factors for disease would constitute threats to health but 
are not the only kind of threat that may be averted by a disease-prevention program.   In the 
Avahan case, for example, threats to basic well-being would include the clear threat to health 
presented by risk of HIV infection.  However, given the multi-dimensional nature of well-being, 
there are multiple other manifestations of threat in the Avahan context.  Social stigma, if 
significant enough to deter FSW, MSM, TG, and IDU populations from accessing services, 
forming social attachments or participating in civil society, would be considered a threat to basic 
well-being.  Police brutality threatening the personal security of sex workers would constitute a 
threat.  Lack of education or skill that prevented gainful employment and a means to securing 
sufficient food and housing would similarly be a threat to basic well-being.  Again, the practical 
implication for donor agencies is the need to recognize the underlying vulnerabilities of end-user 





2. How might a donor identify which threats it is responsible for averting? 
The Least Cost Theory would assign donor agencies responsibility for averting only those 
threats to basic well-being that it is in the least-cost position to avert.  While it may not be clear 
which threats these are, a conservative interpretation would suggest that a donor agency would 
assume responsibility for averting threats to well-being that are currently being averted by the 
program they fund and that no other agent is effectively averting for the current population of 
end-users.  Thus, it would not suggest that a donor agency necessarily be assigned responsibility 
for averting all threats to basic well-being that its population of end-users may face.  The intended 
consequence of applying the Least Cost Theory is rather to ensure that the cessation of donor 
support does not reintroduce the end-user population to threats to basic well-being from which 
they were previously protected by the donor.   
Donor agencies would accordingly take on responsibilities to avert threats to well-being only 
if their programs are effectively averting them. The Least-Cost Theory generates no responsibility 
for donor agency to ensure the continuation of ineffective programs, nor to continue to provide 
services that avert threats to well-being when there are other, more proximal actors who are 
willing and able to avert them with no external assistance. 
With that in mind, a critical part of preparing for exit is understanding the multiple ways in 
which the current program affects the well-being of the target population in order to identify 
precisely which threats a given donor agency is responsible for averting either directly or by 
empowering others.  Outcome and impact evaluations are one tool that could inform donors of the 
threats their programs are currently averting; however, in order for evaluations to successfully 
identify the threats to well-being, it would need to look at more than health related outcomes – as 
noted above, there would need to be ways to tell whether the program averted threats to other 
dimensions of well-being.  Many health and development programs include a variety of 
interventions, some of which address health needs directly, but others of which work through 




intentionally or unintentionally have impact on other dimensions of well-being.  Thus, to fully 
understand the impact of a program may require empirical work that engages end-users directly in 
describing how the program affects their well-being.   
For instance, Avahan programming was primarily developed to control the spread of HIV in 
key populations in India.  However, the Avahan Initiative also supported community-oriented 
activities to address underlying vulnerabilities of key population communities.  For female sex 
worker populations, for example, the program initiated community mobilization and 
empowerment activities to reduce violence, including the support of crisis response centers, legal 
literacy and advocacy training.  These interventions were important not only for gaining the 
support from at-risk populations that later generated demand for biomedical and behavioral 
interventions, but for their independent value of averting threats to personal security and 
individual agency.  Thus, assuming no other actor was providing similar protections from threat 
to personal security and individual agency, donor agencies would be responsible for ensuring that 
these threats also remain averted after exit. 
To determine which threats to basic well-being a donor agency is responsible for averting, 
then, would require proactive efforts to understand which threats are averted by the donor-
supported program, and further, whether the donor is the only actor currently averting those 
threats.  Donor agencies can begin to understand the full range of threats to basic well-being 
which their programs avert by designing and implementing evaluations that would identify 
impact on multiple dimensions of well-being.  Further, donor agencies would also have to engage 
in dialogue and coordination with other in-country actors to determine whether the threats would 
likely remain averted in the donor’s absence.  Importantly, these efforts would have to occur well 
in advance of exit in order to not only identify the responsibilities one has but allow time to 





3. If a donor seeks to discharge special responsibilities by empowering others, how can 
they determine which of the numerous more proximal actors they ought to empower? 
According to the Least-Cost Theory, Wenar suggests that responsibilities that have been 
shifted to a distal actor with secondary responsibility, such as a donor, should ideally be 
transitioned inward towards the actor with primary responsibility.  To determine who holds 
primary responsibility for averting threats to basic well-being we can refer back to Wenar’s 
construct of “role responsibility” and systems of roles, under which responsibilities are assigned 
to individuals according to their belonging to a general category of roles that would be able to 
avert a threat with least burden.
22
  For health and development programs, the role of financing 
health programs is generally assigned to governments or private sector actors or some 
combination of public and private actors.  Delivery of services is assigned to a group of trained 
providers supported by implementing organizations that may be either part of public system or 
grantees of the government.  Responsibility for engaging in healthy prevention behaviors may be 
assigned to at-risk individuals.  The system of roles that results in the aversion of a threat with 
least burden may differ from place to place, and the overarching implication of this approach is 
that a donor agency would need to understand how the activities of a program align with the 
capacities of the agents present in the program setting.  Because a donor program may fill many 
roles in terms of threat aversion – for example, providing monetary resources as well as 
managerial expertise and support for key personnel – it may be that shifting responsibility to the 
role with primary responsibility may involve empowering multiple sets of actors each filling only 
the roles they can do with the least burden. 
In transitioning the Avahan Initiative BMGF identified two sets of actors to take over certain 
responsibilities, which were referred to as “natural owners.”  Informants from BMGF described 
the process as essentially two transitions: transition of financing and management responsibilities 
to the government, and transition of demand-generating and advocacy, including to some extent 




concept described by Wenar in which different actors take on the specific roles they are in 
position to support with least cost.  Informants described government as a natural owner given its 
unique access to resources and its national reach needed to implement an initiative of Avahan’s 
size.  Key population communities were similarly identified given their central stake in the 
continuation of services - ultimately, they are the agents most proximal to threat and are 
responsible for doing what they reasonably can to protect themselves from harm, including taking 
a role in mobilizing their peers and eventually developing the capacity to run organizations that 
meet their needs.  
Interestingly, while Wenar suggests responsibility ought to be transitioned inward, the key 
objective of the Least Cost Theory is to ensure that threats to well-being remain averted.  If there 
is no more proximal agent who is willing to take on responsibility or if sufficient empowerment is 
not feasible with a reasonable level of effort, then the Least Cost Theory would suggest that 
transitioning inward will not result in a most efficient system of averting threats to basic well-
being.  Further, the Least-Cost Theory leaves open the possibility of a lateral transition of 
responsibility to another donor agency or other actors with secondary responsibility who are 
willing and more easily capacitated than host country actors who are more proximal to the threat.  
This option would not accomplish the long-term objective of transitioning responsibility to the 
agent with primary responsibility, but may fulfill a donor’s ethical responsibilities in cases where 
exit is certain and transitioning responsibility inward is overly demanding. 
4. How would one know when a more proximal actor is sufficiently empowered to avert 
threats to basic well-being?  
Arguably the most important, and challenging, aspect of applying the Least Cost Theory is 
determining when the responsibility to avert threats to well-being has been fully discharged.  
Because in most cases it will not be the case that the threat to basic well-being is completely 
averted - short of eradicating disease and eliminating poverty - discharging responsibility will 




avert the threats to basic well-being which a donor agency previously averted.  Following 
Wenar’s approach of transitioning responsibility inward, this will involve empowering host 
country actors to be able to do so, which could consist of a variety of actions consistent with 
organizational and technical capacity building, resource mobilization, advocacy and policy 
development, and other efforts that work to build willingness and capability to effectively avert 
threats to basic well-being.   





 good governance and democracy,
30
 and progress towards the realization 
of human rights.
31
  However, there currently is no universal standard for measuring capacity at a 
system, institutional, or individual level, nor consensus around the benchmarks that indicate 
sufficient strength to avert specific threats to basic well-being, which would likely vary widely 
from place to place.  Despite the plethora of tools to measure capacity, the question still remains: 
what would indicate sufficient empowerment to effectively avert threats to well-being? 
One possible indication of sufficient empowerment would be ensuring that the new agent to 
whom responsibility is transferred would be able to avert threats to well-being without 
exacerbating other threats, in other words, to be able to avert the threat without introducing 
another.  This is similar to the concept of inverse cross-category risk described by Wolff and de-
Shalit, which refers to risks that arise from efforts to mitigate a different type of risk. 
26(p70)
  For 
example, the Avahan Initiative supported service delivery at program supported clinics with drop-
in centers, which were physical spaces in which otherwise marginalized populations could come 
at their convenience, without threat of stigma or discrimination, to receive care and interact with 
other individuals with shared interests.  This safe physical location served to avert threats of 
stigma and discrimination, and at the same time, promote well-being by enabling marginalized 
populations to form social affiliations and receive a level of dignity and respect otherwise lacking 
in their lives.  In the process of transitioning responsibility from BMGF to the Government of 




instead referred to government clinics to receive services.  According to this preliminary standard 
of determining whether a  new actor is sufficiently empowered to fully discharge a donor 
agency’s responsibility, the referral to government clinics would have to ensure that the services 
needed to avert threats to health remain accessible, and also that the transition to government 
facilities does not reintroduce threats to  personal security, dignity and affiliation that were 
protected by the safe, stigma-free environment the program-supported clinic and drop-in center.  
For example, if social stigma towards individuals served by a donor-supported program remained 
so high at the time of transition that end-users would forego access to services provided at 
government clinics, they would essentially be put in a position of having to trade-off protection 
from threats to health for protection from threats to respect, dignity, and affiliation.  In such a 
case, this standard of determining empowerment would suggest that government actors would not 
be sufficiently empowered to avert the threats to basic well-being of end-users that had previously 
been averted, and that additional support would be required to ensure end-users could receive 
services free from such threats.  This might include support for alternative service venues, 
continued support for structural interventions to reduce stigma, or some combination of actions 
that effectively work to secure continued access to services without compromising other aspects 
of basic well-being.  Conversely, if end-users accessing services at government facilities did not 
incur threats to other dimensions of well-being that were previously protected, it would be an 
indication that government actors are sufficiently empowered to take on this responsibility, and 
donors would have discharged their responsibility.  The multi-dimensional understanding of well-
being suggests that the cessation of a particular program activity in conjunction with donor exit is 
not necessarily a threat to basic well-being, nor is the continuation of an activity necessarily 
indicative of the continued aversion of a threat to basic well-being.  Instead, the multi-
dimensional nature of basic well-being results in a more nuanced relationship between a specific 




analysis of how the cessation of donor support will impact the multiple aspects of well-being 
experienced by end-users in the specific context of the program. 
To put such an approach into action, it is necessary to have metrics that indicate more than a 
general capacity to deliver services, and specifically the capacity to avert threats to multiple 
dimensions of well-being.  Given that discharging responsibilities through transition can involve 
multiple different sets of actors fulfilling different roles, it would also be necessary to consider 
each actor’s level of capacity to avert threats to well-being separately.  So for example, in the 
Avahan transition, discharging responsibilities to government and community actors would 
involve assessing government and institutional capacity to fulfill their roles as funders, program 
managers, and implementers separately from the capacity of end-user populations to advocate for 
the needs and hold service providers accountable for the continued provision of services they 
need for their well-being.  
Determining which capacities are representative “sufficient empowerment” for government 
and institutional actors may be feasible given the available metrics for health systems and 
program performance, if approached with the intention of assessing threats to well-being.  The 
exact indicators and level of performance would need to be identified on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on which threats to basic well-being were relevant.  Developing a process to identify 
which tools and indicators would best address the capacities needed to effectively avert threats to 
basic well-being in a particular case is an area for further inquiry.   
Determining how to assess sufficient empowerment at an individual level seems potentially 
more challenging partly because the capacity to avert threats to one’s own well-being may be 
quite different in different settings.  At minimum, end-users ought to be able to articulate their 
needs and advocate for the services they need to protect themselves from harm.  Thus, some 
measures of advocacy capacity and behavior change may be important components for 




communities gain agency, they may reach a level of empowerment to engage in service delivery 
and implementation taking on a larger role in the aversion of threats to basic well-being.   
The Avahan transition case provides one example of how empowerment might be monitored 
in preparation for transition.  A specialized index was developed to assess “community 
ownership” and included  measures of leadership, governance, decision-making, and capacity to 
engage with both state and other social actors.
32
  The Avahan experience additionally showed that 
the process of empowering vulnerable communities to generate demand for needed services and 
to advocate for their rights can be a much longer process than that of empowering government 
institutions to have sufficient capacity to finance and deliver health services.  BMGF invested in 
continued community strengthening activities for at least a year following the transition of 
financing and management responsibilities to government.  BMGF’s hesitancy to disengage while 
community empowerment remained relatively low further supports the notion that transitioning 
responsibility to more proximal agents before they are willing and able to do so effectively does 
not fully discharge a donor’s responsibilities, and additional investment of time and resources 
may be ethically required. 
Ultimately, the true indication of whether new actors have been sufficiently empowered is the 
continued absence of threats to well-being.  Given that there may be a lag between the exit of a 
donor and the actual occurrence of threat, a final implication of applying the Least Cost Theory to 
assigning responsibility is that the exit should be a gradual process, and donor agencies who may 
have ethical responsibilities remain available to support local actors, even after responsibilities 
for continuing service implementation has occurred, to ensure that local actors are actually 
effective in averting threats to basic well-being.   
Conclusion 
This paper has explored the nature of the responsibilities that donor agencies may have in the 
context of exit, and argued that that Leif Wenar’s Least Cost Theory of distributing 




donor agencies are in part responsible for ensuring that threats to the basic well-being of end-
users that have been averted by donor-supported programs remain averted after exit.  Further, this 
argument also suggests that donor agencies can discharge this responsibility by empowering more 
proximal host country agents to be able to avert the threats themselves.  Through a process of 
sufficient capacity-building and advocacy, which renders agents more proximal to the threat both 
willing and able to avert threats previously averted by a donor-support program, donor agencies 
may effectively shift their responsibility inward toward actors better situated to perform the duties 
necessary to avert threats to basic well-being. 
This analysis further provides practical insight into what an ethically responsible exit entails.  
In its basic application, the Least Cost Theory provides a moral basis for assigning to donor 
agencies the responsibility to ensure that resources sufficient to continue averting the harms 
threatening the well-being of end-users are committed prior to exit.  Thus, rather than requiring 
implementing agencies to bear the sole burden of mobilizing resources to continue to implement 
services that effectively protect end-user populations from threats to basic well-being, the Least 
Cost principle would put the onus on donor agencies to identify, empower, and if necessary, 
convince a new actor to commit sufficient resources in their absence.  As a result, the application 
of the Least Cost Theory ensures that vulnerable end-user populations are not re-exposed to 
threats to basic well-being after donors exit from a funding engagement. 
Extending the application of the Least-Cost Theory in a more specified way gives rise to 
further recommendations about how donor agencies should approach the process of discharging 
their responsibility. 
Understand how the program affects end-user well-being.  
 In order to determine which aspects of a program are important to continue to protect end-
user vulnerabilities, donor agencies should approach the process of exit by understanding how the 
program affects end-user well-being.  This could be accomplished by engaging in prospective, 




may include evaluations not only of the program’s impact on health outcomes, but  also of the 
program’s role in mitigating other types of threats, for example, those posed by stigma, 
discrimination, and violence.  Further, it may require empirical research to understand the 
program’s role in averting other threats to well-being identified from the user’s perspective. 
Identify what capacities are needed to continue to avert threats to well-being. 
 In order to know what more proximal actors need to be empowered to do, it is necessary to 
determine what capacities are necessary to avert the threats that a donor supported program is 
currently averting.  While evaluations aimed at understanding threats to well-being may identify 
program components which need to continue, this step represents a more internal process of 
understanding the functions of the donor-supported program that are critical to averting threats to 
basic well-being.  This will identify not only which aspects of programming need to be 
transitioned, but also provide insight into the types of capacities that host-country actors would 
need to have to effectively shift responsibility inward.   
Identify actors within the existing system who can be empowered to take on responsibility with 
a reasonable level of effort.  
 
 In order to identify actors to whom a particular responsibility should be transitioned, donor 
agencies need to understand the local context in which a program operates, and determine who is 
best situated to take on the responsibility in question.  Ideally, one could identify a host country 
actor who holds primary responsibility.  If not, donor agencies may have to look to other actors 
who are both willing and able to take over responsibilities with a reasonable level of effort by the 
donor.  This may be accomplished through dialogue and continued engagement with other in-
country actors to determine what the strengths and interests are, and how much effort would be 
required to sufficiently empower them to take over the donor agency’s role in averting threats to 
basic well-being.  Determination of a “reasonable” level of effort is subjective, but ultimately, the 
donor agency ought to be realistic about the level of capacity-building it can support, and identify 




Determine when to transition using a variety of indicators that assess capacities to avert threats 
to well-being. 
  
 In order to determine when it is appropriate to transition responsibility to a new actor, there 
should be a reasonable level of confidence that the new actor actually will be able to fulfill the 
responsibility effectively.  This will likely require consideration of a wide range of indicators to 
assess “readiness” to transition responsibility.  While criteria for determining readiness for exit, 
or “graduation” as it is sometimes called, often include measures of economic strength and 
resource availability, the Least-Cost Theory would suggest that the capacity of a country 
government to fund a program is not enough; rather, it is the capacity of the entire system of roles 
that together contribute to the continued aversion of threats that needs to be considered.   This 
would mean considering a broader scope of indicators, including but not limited to, the technical 
and organizational capacity of host country health systems, as well as behavioral indicators of at-
risk populations to determine willingness to continue to engage with the program.   
Exit gradually to ensure new actors effectively do avert threats to basic well-being.  
Given the challenges of assessing “sufficient empowerment” a responsible exit will likely 
require a gradual process of exit in which a donor agency remains available to provide additional 
resources in the event that threats to basic well-being are reintroduced after transition.  While this 
may be a substantially greater commitment than a donor may desire, it may lead to more realistic 
goals for projects constrained by a fixed timeline and budget, and ultimately, it may enhance the 
likelihood that exit does not reintroduce prior threats to well-being to the end-user populations 
they intended to benefit. 
While these recommendations in many ways reinforce existing recommendations for exit, 
specifically, to consider capacity indicators in the consideration of “readiness” to transition, to 
allow time to build capacity prior to exit, and to exit gradually and on a flexible timeline, these 
recommendations go further in explaining why these practices are important.  Furthermore, the 




exit through an ethical lens highlights the additional motivation of protecting end-users from 
harm in the process.  By considering exit through the lens of transitioning responsibility for the 
continued aversion of threats to basic well-being, the process of transition becomes one of 
empowerment through which vulnerability is ultimately diminished as end-users and host country 
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Appendix A: Methods 
 
Overview of Study Design 
This dissertation included both empirical and normative projects.  The empirical project 
sought to describe and understand the phenomenon of program transition with respect to the 
concepts of sustainability and ownership through a single case study of the Avahan Initiative’s 
transition to local ownership.  Methods were developed with guidance from Robert Yin’s guide to 
case study research.  Data collected for the empirical project included in-depth interviews with 
key informants representing multiple stakeholder views on transition; analysis consisted of 
multiple qualitative techniques to break down and reconstruct the data, including qualitative 
description, pattern-matching, and explanation-building.   
The normative project aimed to explore the nature of donor responsibilities relevant to the 
process of donor exit and identify a theoretical normative basis to inform the development of 
action guiding recommendations for an ethically responsible exit.  Methods followed an adapted 
version of a standard philosophical method of investigating specific types of responsibilities, and 
drew from the empirical data to inform practically relevant guidance. 
This methods appendix provides an overview of the phenomenon of transition, provides a 
justification for the methodological approach, and details the procedures followed for case 
selection, primary data collection, and data analysis for the empirical project, as well as the 
process of philosophical analysis employed for the normative project.  
Phenomenon of Interest: Program Transition 
This case study sought to understand the phenomenon of transition, which has gained 
currency in light of increasing efforts to improve the sustainability of global health initiatives, and 
of HIV prevention and control in particular.  Sustaining improvements in HIV control beyond the 
life of specific donor-funded health initiatives has been a persistent goal for global health 
initiatives,
1-3




quickly.  Particularly for HIV/AIDS programming, donor-supported delivery systems have been 
the primary means for prevention, care, and treatment services, with relatively little investment in 
designing programs to be sustainable within domestic health systems.
4
  Transition has thus 
emerged as a process of transferring responsibilities for program implementation from donors to 
in-country actors in an effort to promote sustainability, building country ownership and 
capacity.
5-8
  Transition remains an ill-defined concept, however, as some have questioned the 
extent to which greater “ownership” by in country actors enhances sustainability,
9-12
 and worried 
that premature transition may undermine, rather than enhance, the gains made in controlling the 
HIV epidemic.
13
  This apparent tension between transitioning ownership of HIV programming 
and sustaining gains in HIV control suggests that the relationship between ownership and 
sustainability may not be straightforward, and points to a need for greater conceptual and 
practical clarity on the phenomenon of transition, the way in which it may enhance or hinder the 
impact of donor investments in HIV, and what responsibilities donors have for the long-term 
sustainability of their programs.  The empirical project aimed to: 
1. Identify the conceptual relationships between transition, sustainability and ownership.  
2. Describe how programs change in the process of transition and the significance of change 
with respect to the sustainability. 
The normative project aimed to: 
 
3. Explore potential responsibilities donors may have for the long-term sustainability of 
their work in order to inform practical guidance for donors seeking to transition 
responsibly. 
Methodological Approach: Empirical Project 
This study employed a case study approach treating the Avahan transition as the main unit of 
analysis.  According to Yin case study methodology is defined in two parts: the first part of the 
case study method involves defining the scope, the second part provides ways of handling the 
technical challenges of data analysis and design.
14(p16) 
 Case study methods are bounded in scope 




phenomenon, and 2) a phenomenon that occurs within a real-life context where the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not easily apparent.  Given the highly contextual 
experience of program sustainability, case study is an ideal method to investigate the process of 
transition within the contextual factors to which it is bound. 
Case study methodology is additionally characterized by specific approaches to data 
collection and analysis.  Yin explains that because case studies are highly context dependent, 
there will be more variables of interest than data points available, which means that data 
collection will include multiple sources that ultimately converge through a process of 
triangulation.
14(p17)
  For this study, key informants were the primary source of data and 
triangulation was employed in reference to the perspective from which informants experienced 
transition, representing multiple stakeholder perspectives including the “giving” side of transition 
(e.g. donor and donor-supported implementers) as well as the in-country partners “receiving” the 
program.  Triangulation was also employed in reference to the conceptual frame of 
understanding; the phenomenon of transition was explored as it related to the concepts of 
ownership and sustainability.  
Human Subjects Note 
This project involved interviews with human beings and was therefore submitted for review 
to the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health (JHSPH) Institutional Review Board.  
The project assigned IRB # 4895 was reviewed and determined exempt on Feb. 28
th
, 2013 on the 
basis that the research collected data from humans and not about humans and therefore did not 
require IRB approval.  As part of good research practices, oral consent was obtained prior to each 
interview (Appendix A1). 
Case Selection 
The Avahan transition was selected as a single case in which to explore the concepts of 




for a single case-study approach for several reasons.  First, as one of the first planned and well-
documented transitions of a large-scale HIV program, the Avahan transition was unique in the 
level of investment given to transition and a case study of this transition offered revelatory 
value
14(pp51-2) 
on its own.  Second, because it was occurring in India, a middle-income country 
with a relatively strong health budget and health delivery systems relative to other countries in 
which large scale, donor-supported HIV program were occurring, the Avahan transition was also 
a critical case because it would provide insight into transition outcomes that occur in contexts 
where donors invest substantial resources and planning in the transition process and health 
system constraints are relatively low.  Third, JHSPH had an existing relationship with BMGF 
through a contract to perform a structured evaluation of the transition,
15
 which made the Avahan 
transition a convenient one in which to engage in further exploratory research.  
Two smaller regions in which Avahan was implemented, the state of Andhra Pradesh in 
South India and the states of Manipur and Nagaland in the Northeast region, were chosen as sub-
cases in which to explore the experience of transition in-depth.   
These states were selected to provide maximum variation with respect to a) the key 
population served, b) the underlying organizational capacity the public health system, and c) 
differences in the timing and preparation for transition.  Avahan programming in Andhra Pradesh 
served primarily female sex worker populations.  South India is generally accepted as having 
higher institutional capacity than the Northeast, and a history of community based movements 
around other public health and social issues.  The transition experience in the South was 
characterized by more or less timely execution and success in sustaining outcomes one year post-
transition, as indicated by preliminary data collection from JHSPH colleagues.  Avahan 
programming in the northeast region concentrated in two states, Nagaland and Manipur, and 
served primarily injecting drug user (IDU) populations.  The Northeast is characterized by low 




delays in the timing of transition, with transition occurring over a condensed time period of one 
year rather than the three rounds spread across four years, as occurred in the Southern states. 
The case study sought to explore perspectives from the donor institution (BMGF), 
implementing partners (SLPs), and GoI counterparts about their understanding of the intended 
goals of transition and relationship to the concepts of sustainability and ownership, elucidate 
tensions or challenges experienced during the transition process with respect to concepts of 
sustainability and ownership, and explore perceptions of ethical responsibilities related to the 
process of withdrawing support from a long-term funding engagement. 
Key Informant Sampling 
Primary data included 22 open-ended key informant interviews.  Sampling of specific key 
informants was purposive and driven by several considerations. 
First, the researcher sought maximum variation sampling
16
 with respect to the informants’ 
position in transition, striving for diverse perspectives from both the “giving” and “receiving” 
side of transition.  Informants were selected to represent perspectives from the Government of 
India (GoI), BMGF, and grantees managing the implementation of Avahan programming (SLPs) 
and/or the transition specifically (BMGF supported specific “transition managers” to oversee 
transition after the first round of transition in 2009).  Informants from the GoI included one 
informant each from the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) and State AIDS Control 
Societies (SACS), and four informants from Technical Support Units (TSUs) at the national and 
state level.  From BMGF, informants represented perspective both from the head office as well as 
Program Officers working in two different states.  Of the implementing partners sampled, 
participants represented perspectives from three different grantees (See Table 1 for participant 
characteristics).   
Sampling was also limited by several constraints.  Because the case study required deep 




had been in some position related to Avahan or the National AIDS Control Program (NACP) for 
at least one year.  Additionally, because the nature of the case study was an exploration of 
somewhat abstract concepts of sustainability and local ownership, informants were limited 
individuals having higher-level positions and greater opportunity to reflect on the underlying 
issues driving transition.  Additional participants were identified by informants in the above 
groups as having key information relevant to the objectives of the study. 
Participant Recruitment 
Key informants were identified in consultation with JHSPH/Indian colleagues with existing 
relationships based on previous data collection for a BMGF-supported evaluation of the 
transition.  The initial list of participants included key stakeholders with Avahan at the national 
and state level, in addition to persons involved in the planning and implementation of transition 
within the NACO of the GoI, and external to Avahan but active in the transition, such as 
individuals engaged in technical assistance to government or grantees at some point prior to or 
after transition.   
 Informants were contacted first by email with a general recruitment script (Appendix A2) 
describing the aims of the research and requesting participation in a 45-60 minute interview.  A 
phone call followed the initial email if no response was received within 7 days (Appendix A3).  
Of those contacted, all agreed to participate, although one was subject to multiple rescheduling 
attempts and ultimately not completed. 









Table 1: Key Informant Sample Characteristics 
 
Stakeholder Perspective N Region Program Affiliation 
BMGF 6 Multi-state Avahan 
State Lead Partners 10 South (n=5) 
Northeast (n=5) 
Avahan 
Government of India 2 South (n=1) 
National(n=1) 
NACP 





TOTAL 22   
 
In-depth Interview Process 
One researcher (AP) conducted all interviews in English; 19 were conducted in-person and 
three over the phone.  Interviews took place at various sites in New Delhi, Hyderabad, and 
Guwahati India, and one interview at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation headquarters in 
Seattle between May 1
st
 and July 30
st
, 2013.  Oral consent was asked of each participant before 
beginning the interview (Appendix A1).  Informants spoke in their professional role or with 
respect to their former role related to the Avahan transition if they had since moved to a new 
position.  They were not asked to provide confidential or personally identifying information about 
themselves.   
Interviews followed an interview guide (Appendix A4) that explored broad conceptual 
interpretation of transition, sustainability, and ownership as understood by key informants; their 
perspectives on the goals of transition; as well as their reflections on how the challenges 
associated with transition facilitated or limited the achievement of its goals.  All interviews were 
transcribed by the researcher; names and any other personally identifying information that had 
arisen during the interview were redacted from transcripts, and they were uploaded to qualitative 




Prior to and throughout primary data collection, the researcher reviewed substantial 
documentation and additional data associated with the on-going evaluation of transition, 
including qualitative reports from longitudinal case studies supported by the larger Avahan 
evaluation occurring by JHSPH colleagues,  initial measures of post-transition quantitative 
outcomes, as well as project documentation regarding transition planning, the Avahan mid-
project evaluation, and published, publicly available reports on the Avahan Initiative.  While 
these documents enriched the researcher’s background understanding of the Avahan transition, 
these documents did not include significant content related to the conceptual understanding of the 
stated goals of “sustained response” and “local ownership” and thus were not considered data 
collected or analyzed as part of the case study.  Qualitative data from the longitudinal case studies 
conducted for the overarching evaluation did include some content related to the changes 
experienced at the level of implementing NGOs.  However, these interviews were conducted with 
informants from the implementing organizations, one level below the SLPs.   While they were not 
reviewed as part of analysis, they did offer further validation of the changes and challenges 
related to transition reported by key informants in this study. 
Data Analysis 
In qualitative research, analysis occurs concurrently with data collection.  Data analysis 
began with recording interview summaries and jottings after each interview.  These activities 
helped identify initial patterns in the data and informed future interviews by identifying areas of 
informational redundancy and, conversely, areas of inquiry to continue to pursue, facilitating the 
determination of when informational redundancy had been reached.  Because the first 18 
interviews were conducted within a relatively short time period of five weeks, analysis during 
collection was limited to initial summaries and memos, with the bulk of analysis occurring after 
return from the field. 
Data analysis included techniques for descriptive analysis, interpretative analysis, and 




study.  Analysis was guided by descriptive and analytic questions about the phenomenon of 
transition, including: 
Descriptive:  
 What were the intended outcomes of the Avahan transition? 
 In what ways did Avahan programming change in the process of transition? 
 How were the changes that occurred through transition viewed with respect to the 
sustainability of the program’s impact? 
Analytic: 
 What conceptual understanding of “sustainability” and “local ownership” 
motivated the Avahan transition? 
 What does transition have to accomplish, in terms of what is transitioned to 
whom, in order to achieve sustainability and local ownership? 
 
Descriptive analysis. Descriptive analysis included identifying the intended outcomes of the 
Avahan transition as well as the types of programmatic changes that occurred as a result of 
transition.  Descriptive analysis therefore focused on the content within interview data that 
corresponded to these topics.  Analysis began with an initial or “first cycle” coding
17(p70) 
that 
captured the main ideas in the text in response to the “what” questions of the case.  First cycle 
coding included deductive codes based on interview guides to identify transition goals, types of 
changes, and challenges associated with aligning to the host-country system identified by key 
informants.  Content analysis
18,19
 as a method of qualitative description
20
 facilitated the formation 
of descriptive summary categories, the outcomes of transition, types of programmatic changes, 
and perceived significance described by key informants.  
Interpretive analysis. Interpretive analysis included some similar approaches as the 
descriptive analysis, but moved beyond description in order to abstract higher-level themes from 
the data in order to develop a conceptual model to relate the concepts of sustainability and 
ownership to the intended outcomes of transition.  Similar to the process for the descriptive 
questions, initial coding was applied.
17(p70)
  Initial coding followed broad deductive categories 
corresponding to interview topics including the goals of transition, the conceptual understanding 




understood by informants.  These categories were intentionally broad given that the nature of the 
project was to explore concepts and construct concepts informed by the collective experience of 
key informants.   Based on initial application of categories to the data, a set of codes and sub-
codes was developed (Appendix A5).  Codes replaced categories and codes were further refined 
into a set of sub-codes (e.g., “ownership” was broken into two emic categories of codes 
corresponding to “government ownership,” “community ownership;”  “sustainability” was broken 
into categories of “facilitating factors” and “constraining factors.”)   
Once the new set of codes and sub-codes were applied to the data, a second level of analysis, 
or second cycle 
coding17(p86)
 involved examining patterns within and between codes and sub-codes.  
First the relationship between the parent code and related sub-codes was defined.  For example, 
sub-codes of the parent code ‘sustainability’ were related as ‘facilitating functions’ or ‘roles’, 
sub-codes of the parent code ‘ownership’ were related as ‘actions’ corresponding to  
“responsibilities,” and sub-codes for the parent code ‘goals of transition’ were grouped into sub-
codes including ‘continued delivery of services’, ‘maintained quality of services’, ‘retained 





 and data displays were used to further develop and refine these codes and sub-codes 
into emerging themes that characterized the concepts of sustainability, ownership, and described 
the goals of transition. 
After developing themes for each concept, the process of explanation building
14
 was used to 
identify the relationships between the concepts and develop a model that “explained” the intended 
outcomes of transition by relating factors of sustainability to the actions of ownership in a 
coherent way.   This was a process of identifying patterns between and among parent codes and 
sub-codes and identifying whether and how some emerging themes were relevant across the  
concepts of ‘sustainability’, ‘ownership’, and the ‘goals of transition’.  For example, the theme of 




consistent with the goals of transition.  In terms of ‘sustainability’, ‘leadership’ was a facilitator 
of sustainability in the sense of sustaining attention and priority to HIV prevention.  In terms of 
‘ownership’, ‘leadership’ was consistent with actions demonstrating the desire or want to take on 
responsibilities for continuing to support and finance program delivery and maintain its quality.  
In terms of the ‘goals of transition’, strong leadership was consistent with goals of continuing 
service delivery and quality because it was perceived as necessary to support resource 
mobilization and a commitment to continued quality.  Similarly, the theme of ‘ability to innovate 
and change according to data’ was related to the concepts of ‘sustainability’ and ‘ownership’ and 
consistent with sub-codes of ‘goals of transition’.  In terms of ‘sustainability,’ the ability to 
innovate and change was described as a facilitator of sustainability.  In terms of ‘ownership’, 
‘ability to innovate and change according to data’ was consistent with several actions described as 
part of government ownership. ‘Ability to innovate and change according to data’ was also 
consistent with the goal of maintaining program quality.  Identifying relationships across 
concepts and themes in this way led to the construction of a candidate model of program 
sustainability constructed in terms of roles and responsibilities and informed the placement of 
each role within the model.    
A further step was to test the hypothesized relationships in the model against the data.  This 
was an additional part of the explanation-building process of testing an initial proposition or 
explanation and against the data.
14(pp148-9)
  This was an iterative process of rearranging and 
refining the components in the model to make it consistent with the data.  Specifically, the 
relationships between particular roles and responsibilities in the model and outcomes of transition 
were tested against the description of the roles and responsibilities transferred through the process 
of “transitioning ownership” and its intended outcomes.  This tested whether the model could 
“explain” how the process of transitioning ownership described in the case would result in the 
intended outcomes described.   That is, this process ensured that the roles and responsibilities 




and the relevance of each role with respect to an intended outcome of transition was similarly 
consistent with the configuration of the model; there were not key roles or responsibilities 
identified in informants’ descriptions that were not somehow represented in the model; nor were 
there aspects of the model completely absent from description.   
Identifying and Mitigating Threats to Validity 
Yin identifies four dimensions that can be used to assess the quality of case study designs and 
the validity of the results they yield: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and 
reliability.
14(pp45-9)
  Miles, Huberman, and Saldana offer alternative set of corresponding criteria 
for qualitative research, which are credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
objectivity.
17(pp312-14)
  The following section considers how the methodological design of this case 
study meets these criteria. 
Construct Validity 
The traditional view of construct validity is as a test of whether the researcher has truly 
measured the phenomenon of interest.  While qualitative case studies do not “measure” with 
quantitative indicators, there is still concern that the phenomenon of interest is truly occurring in 
the chosen case.
14(p45)
  In this case study, the construct of transition was itself under study given 
there currently is not a precise or universally accepted definition for it.   
The Avahan case was selected in part because BMGF had a clearly articulated objective of 
obtaining a sustained response by transferring ownership to local actors, and therefore represents 
a case that can provide hypothesis-generating conclusions about a potentially generalizable 
phenomenon of transition. The construct of transition captured in this case study is strengthened 
by triangulating perspectives of multiple stakeholders involved in the process and therefore limits 
the potential bias of using only one perspective.  By including in the findings of this case study a 




processes taken to constitute transition and allows outsiders to determine whether other case 
examples reflect the same underlying phenomenon.  
Internal Validity/Credibility 
The criterion of internal validity relates to the veracity of the conclusions made about the 
case.  For qualitative work, this criterion is about whether the conclusions are believable from the 
perspective of those who participated.  In order to enhance the internal validity of the conclusions 
drawn from this case study, several analytic techniques, including pattern-matching and 
explanation building were relied upon to ensure the findings accurately represent the data in the 
case.   
External Validity/ Transferability  
External validity relates to the transferability of case study findings.  Similar to the 
consideration construct validity, this criterion is addressed by providing a rich description of what 
transition entailed as well as the context in which it occurred.  This allows outsiders to understand 
the contextual factors that shaped the findings of the case, and determine the extent to which they 
are represented in another setting.   
Reliability/Dependability 
Reliability or dependability refers to the ability for another researcher to reach similar 
conclusions about the same case.  The reliability of this case was strengthened by creation and 
use of several techniques to document and catalogue the process of the case study, including a 
case study protocol and case study database.  The protocol includes detailed documentation of the 
collection of evidence (e.g., sampling criteria, interview guides, recruitment scripts, and guiding 
questions for analysis).  The case study database is a catalogue of the documents showing the 
progression of line of inquiry, from initial research questions to the data collected through 
interviews (e.g. redacted transcripts), case notes, analytic memos and data displays, which were 
saved and easily available for consultation during the iterative process of analysis. Taken 




the case study to the case study protocol, primary data collected, analytic process and findings of 
the case study to enhance reliability.  
Objectivity/Confirmability 
The criterion of objectivity or confirmability has to do with the extent to which the 
researchers own biases may influence the finding.  Throughout the research process, the 
researcher engaged in the practice of reflexivity to reflect upon the ways in which personal 
experiences shape interpretations and remain cognizant of these during data analysis in order to 
minimize negative effects of bias on data representation.  
Methodological Approach: Normative Project 
The normative aim of this dissertation was to characterize the morally relevant concern of the 
context of donor exit, and identify a normative basis for developing a practically useful account 
donor responsibilities related to the process of exit.  The method of normative analysis for this 
aim applied a standard method of philosophical inquiry for analyzing a specific type of 
responsibility.  The standard approach is to critically consider 1) why the responsibility should be 
said to exist, 2) what might limit the demands of the responsibility, and 3) how the contents of the 
responsibility would be specified.
21
  
Because moral and political philosophy have only recently begun to address issues related to 
global health and global justice, there is not yet consensus about the kinds of responsibilities that 
are most relevant to the practice of global health aid, nor what they require.
22
  As such, the 
approach to addressing the first criterion, why a responsibility should be said to exist, was to 
investigate a premise consistent with a moral intuition voiced in the empirical investigation of the 
Avahan Initiative’s transition, and then critically examine existing normative accounts of 
responsibility to identify one that supports the premise.  This process identified the normative 
concept of “vulnerability” as the moral concern in the context of transition, and specifically, the 




them from threats to basic well-being.  This is consistent with a type of responsibility in the 
normative literature related to the aversion of harms or threats to basic well-being, and directed 
normative inquiry in the direction of examining theories of distributing responsibilities that would 
support the premise that donor agencies are in part responsible for ensuring that threats to the 
basic well-being of end-users that have been averted by donor-supported programs remain 
averted after exit.  
To identify a normative approach consistent with the premise, theories of responsibility were 
limited to those concerned with the assignment of responsibilities in contexts similar to that of 
transition, in which a donor is already engaged in an effective program, where the programs are 
targeting populations facing many potential threats to health and well-being, and in which there 
are multiple other moral agents present.  Through these considerations, two theories were 
identified: David Miller’s approach to distributing remedial responsibilities described as the 
Connection Theory
23
 and Leif Wenar’s approach Least Cost Theory
24
 for assigning responsibility 
for the aversion of threats to basic well-being.  These two approaches to distributing 
responsibility for the aversion of harms to basic well-being were critically examined to determine 
whether they would support the premise identified above, and also against other potentially 
constraining factors that might limit the responsibility, corresponding to step two of the analytic 
approach identified above.  Considerations of demandingness and fairness were identified as 
potential constraining factors.  For example, a possible outcome of Miller’s Connection Theory 
was the assignment of responsibility for the continuation of needed services primarily to 
implementing organizations, rather than donors, on the basis of the strength of the relationship 
that develops between end-user and providers; this was considered a weakness of the Connection 
Theory because it would result in an unfair distribution of responsibilities by overly burdening 
implementing organizations.  After critical consideration, Wenar’s Least Cost Theory was 
identified as providing a strong normative basis for the premise that donor agencies are in part 




by donor-supported programs remain averted after exit.  Appling the Least Cost Theory to the 
context of exit results in a distribution of responsibilities that was ethically preferable given the 
fairness of the distribution of responsibility that results, and the mechanism it describes for 
discharging responsibility through empowerment, which both prevents donor responsibilities 
from being overly demanding and provides additional support for diminishing vulnerability in the 
long-term. 
As the final step in analysis, the least-cost approach was specified to determine the contents 
of what it requires, following the third consideration of philosophical investigation: can the 
contents of the responsibility be specified.  The case description developed during the empirical 
project provided a practical setting in which to apply the least-cost principle and specify the 
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Appendix A2: Email Recruitment for Subjects Sent from India 
[MONTH _DAY], 2013 
Potential Subject Name 
Address 1 
Address 2 
Dear [Potential Subject’s Name]: 
 
I am currently conducting a research study to describe and consider how public health 
practitioners involved in the design and implementation of program transitions 
understand the long-term implications of transition.  I am also interested in how 
practitioners involved in transitions think about the relationship between transition, 
program sustainability, and ownership.   Because you were involved in the planning, 
design or implementation of the Avahan transition, you are eligible to participate in this 
study. 
 If you agree I will conduct an in-person or phone interview (45-60 minute) at a time 
and place that is convenient for you.  Additional information about the study can be 
found in the attached disclosure statement. 
If you are interested in participating or have questions about the study, please contact 
me at apaul@jhsph.edu or by phone at [local number in India]. If I haven’t heard from 
you after one week, I will re-contact you by phone to see if you would like to participate.  
If you do not wish to receive a phone call, simply contact me at one of the methods listed 
above. 
Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to hearing from you! 
 
Sincerely,  
Amy Paul, MPH 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Health Policy and Management 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
 
Holly Taylor, PhD, MPH 
Associate Professor 
Department of Health Policy and Management 







Appendix A3: Telephone Script 
 
Hello, my name is Amy Paul. As a doctoral student at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health, I am conducting a qualitative research study for my dissertation work. I am writing 
in the hope you would be willing to participate in this study.  [Insert name of reference person] 
suggested that you might be a useful contact for the study due to your experience with the 
Avahan transition.  
 
The purpose of this study is to explore how global health practitioners understand the long-
term implications of transition.  I am also interested in how global health professionals think 
about the relationship of transition to the ideas of sustainability, ownership, and responsibility. 
 
If you are interested in participating, you would be asked to participate in an in-depth 
interview that would take 45-60 minutes of your time, at a time and place of your convenience 
between [dates of site visit]. In this interview, I will ask you about a number of topics related to 
your experience with transition, the decisions made about when to transition and which aspects of 
the program are most important, and how you understand the long-term implications of program 
transition. I will also ask about how you think about the responsibilities different stakeholders 
take on during transition. 
 
If you have any questions about the study and what it would entail, you can reach me by 

















Appendix A4: Sample In-Depth Interview Guide 
Trade-offs in Transition: Understanding shared responsibility for sustainability 
through transitions to local ownership 
 
ID# :__________________________Current Position:___________________ 
Position with Avahan:___________ Period of involvement:___________________ 
 
1. Thank you very much for taking time to speak with me today.  As you know, I am 
interested in your experience with the Avahan transition and your thinking about 
its long-term impact.  To start off with, Tell me about your experience with Avahan? 
 
I would now like to ask you some questions specifically about the period of transition. 
 
2. When I say “transition,” what does that mean to you? 
 
3. What do you think were the long-term goals of the Avahan transition? 
 
 When you first began working with Avahan, what did you think the program 
would look like post-transition? 
 What aspects of Avahan did you want to be continued?  Why? 
 
4. In what ways did you expect the program to change post-transition?   
 
5. What have been some of the unanticipated changes following transition? 
a. What aspects did not continue post transition? 
b. Were there new or additional things that began after transition? 
 
6. How do you think these changes, anticipated or not, will affect the long-term impact 
of the program? 
 Program services? 
 Program goals – impact on HRGs, HIV incidence overall (perceptions)? 
 Capacity of ngos/cbos/government? 
 Relationships between ngos/cbos, ngo/cbos and SACs, SACs and NACO, 
SLPs and SACs 
 
7. I understand that during the transition phase, you’ve adapted the original transition 
strategy in subsequent rounds.   
 What changes did you make to the transition strategy between rounds? 
 How did you prepare TI’s differently? 
 What was the process of making changes to the transition strategy? 




 What did you feel was at stake if you didn’t make changes to the transition 
strategy? 
 
 I would like to ask you more about transition, specifically how it relates to the concept of 
sustainability. 
 
8. To begin with, what does “sustainability” mean to you? 
 
9. How does your current understanding of “sustainability” differ from what you might 
have said before your involvement with Avahan? 
 
10. In what ways do you think transition results in sustainability? 
 
 What do you think would be indicative a having achieved sustainability?  
 Do you think transition is sufficient for sustainability?  What, if anything, 
would you think may also need to happen? 
 In what ways could transition hinder or inhibit sustainability? 
 
As you know, one of the intentions of evaluating Avahan is to understand the 
learning that has occurred and help inform the future of HIV program transitions in 
other countries in the future.  In the U.S., the future of HIV programming is happen 
within a dialogue of “country ownership” and “shared responsibility,” and I would like 
to ask some questions about how you see Avahan in relation to these concepts. 
11. What does “ownership” mean to you? 
 Is country ownership different from local ownership? 
 Who needs to “own” the program? 
 How can you tell if they do? 
 
12. In what ways does transition enhance ownership? 
 
13. In what ways do you think transition can hinder or create challenges to ownership? 
 
14. Knowing what you do now, how might you plan a transition to be consistent with the 
idea of ownership? 
 
At this point, I would like to ask you some questions about motivations and 
responsibilities for different aspects of transition.  I would like to reiterate that there 
are no right or wrong answers to these questions.  I am interested in your perspective 
based on your professional experience and the lessons from the Avahan transition. 
 
15. When you think about the idea of “shared responsibility” and Avahan, what comes to 
mind? 




 How do you think about the role and responsibilities of your transition 
partners? 
 What role and responsibilities do you think communities have? 
16. What, if any, responsibilities do you think the Gates Foundation has for the 
program post-transition? 
 For health outcomes of KPs? 
 To community partners? 
 To government? 
Finally, I would like to ask you some broad questions about the long-term impact of 
the transition for HIV prevention in India. 
16. What do you think was gained or improved by completing transition? 
 
17. What, if anything, did you felt you had to give up during the transition process? 
 
18. What do you think will be the lasting impact of Avahan for HIV prevention in India? 
Thank you very much for your time.  Is there anything else you would like to add?  
Is there anything that we’ve talked about today that you would prefer I exclude from 






Appendix A5:  Descriptive Coding Scheme for Empirical Project 
Goals of Transition 
Code  Definition Illustrative Quote 
Continue 
Services 
Refers to program 
continuing to function  - 
TIs having continued 
financial support and 
program continues to 
operate 
…we had to transition this HIV 
prevention program, particularly the 
prevention program to the government.  
So that it is sustainable, so you know?  
That the government then runs it. It is 
not like we are closing the program.   
Maintain 
Quality 
References to TI 
performance, keeping 
indicators high, maintaining 
impact in terms of 
reduction in HIV incidence 
I would measure the success of 
transition from the government 
perspective is to have reduced HIV 
prevalence … they just continue to 
have reduced HIV. 
Retained 
Capacity 
Refers to keeping 
institutional memory, 
retaining people who have 
had training, retaining 
skills,  
The goal was really to be able to take 
all of the investment – and I’m not 
talking in dollar values, I’m talking in 
building systems and building a 
program and achieving certain outputs 
and outcomes and making sure that 
these sustained, even after the donor 
was out.   
Accountable 
Relationships 
Refers to being able to hold 
program partners 
accountable for quality of  
implementation – refers to 
relationship between 
government and 
communities as well as 




… to be comfortable with SACS’s 
system and to uh, yeah, to, like when 
they are not showing 100% at the 
clinic, to be able to say, well, you 
know, maybe the guy next door claims 
he’s getting 100% - no comment on 
that – but this is the real picture.  And 
to see the value of, um, uh, yeah, 
honest measurement, and a genuine 
concern to see the program improve in 
real terms rather than on paper.   
Sustained 
learnings 
Refers to wanting to 
continue new practices, 
approaches, activities 
developed by Avahan after 
transition 
…the goal was that the learning and 
the good works that we have done, 
what we have tried, be transitioned to 
the government and if possible they 










Facilitators of Transition 
Code Definition Illustrative Quote 
Leadership Refers to instances 
where leadership 
was helpful in 
making transition 
happen – leadership 
to make transition 




It’s not so straight-forward, there is a whole set of 
considerations, there is alignment of agendas, there’s 
– the people in both organizations shift around.  Um, 
you know, ideally yes, but not everyone’s agenda is 
the same as the donors, so it’s easier said than done.  
But that’s where the government can play a role.  
Because the government can say, ‘Look, we want 
your supports and so, to take over this work that 
BMGF has done, because we think it’s important to 




Refers to references 
to of how the 
Avahan program 
aligned with existing 
government or 
community priorities 
…so it all depends on the model, what results it’s 
showing, and how it, uh, in line and in sync with the 
challenges and the problems of the government on 
the day it’s being faced with.  If it’s relevant and in 
line with that, you’ll find the money.   
Negotiation 
and Dialogue 
Refers to references 
where dialogue, 
negotiation, or 
advocacy were part 
of transition process 
– also includes 




…if you look at some other things and let’s say –the 
criteria.  We worked out a criteria for transition 
point, so we looked at I mean, what factors would go 
in to the criteria there and then, what are the positive 
things. We talked to government and then – that it 
how we negotiated with the government and 
developed the criteria.   
Good 
relationships 
Refers to the way in 
which relationships 
were helpful to 
transition process 
So when you call for a meeting you see both the 
people coming in and they see each other there.  So 
there is kind of already an interaction happening 
between those two people there, and then you – both 
of them knowing each other and what is happening in 
that TI, what is happening this TI there – so that kind 
of understanding and sharing happening between 
these two TIs – it was there right from 2010.  July 
onwards.  So that really contributed and that helped 
us in convincing the NGOs that SACS program or 
government program is not very difficult to manage.  













Facilitators of Sustainability 
Code Definition Illustrative Quote 
Ability to Change Refers to importance 
of being able to change 
in order to sustain 
impact – includes 
references to 
innovation, adapting, 
using data to inform 
program activities 
… there have been a lot of change and 
flexibilities as we go along.  So many of these 
data are actually informing the program.  You 
know, its’ not, many a times, um, in some set-
up we collect data and that is for reporting – it 
does not make any sense and as long as you 
get on the 5
th
 of this month you are happy and 
it is stashed away on somewhere.  But one 
thing that we tried to do quite a bit is that we 
allow the NGOs to be able to monitor the 
trends and the change that they see along in 
their data.  And, also change our program 
according to that. 
Leadership Refers to the role of 
leadership in 
sustaining program – 
similar to leadership 
for transition but this 
refers more generally 





time – could apply 
sustainability of 
organizations or 
program as a whole 
I think the most critical [thing] is leadership.  
From the government, not just to acknowledge, 
but also to actually take on a role – a 
proactive role –  in terms of prioritizing the 
right things, pushing the central government to 
put in the money they need, or donors or 
whoever it may be.  Really prioritizing HIV 
and making it have the resources that it needs.  
Not more than it needs, not less than it needs, 
but exactly what it needs 
Resources Refers to importance 
of resources, budget, 
money, human 
resources in continuing 
effective programming 
Sustainability in the context of continuous 
program funding.  That is how I see it.   Uh, 
because HIV prevention program is more – at 
least in AP the majority of the interventions 
are run by the NGOs, of course, funded by 
NACO through APSACS.  And only one donor 
has funding for this program which is BMGF.  
So if the BMGF withdraws funding, then what 
would happen is almost all the HIV funding for 
that particular area will collapse.  So I would 
say that sustainability in the context of 





Wanting program Refers to the 
importance of having 
genuine desire for the 
program to be 
successful – to actually 
care about the impact 
and not just the duty of 
the job 
…to have them be competent and be able to 
defend their performance competently before 
SACS – as they moved into SACS to be 
comfortable with SACS’s system and to uh, 
yeah, to, like when they are not showing 100% 
at the clinic, to be able to say, well, you know, 
maybe the guy next door claims he’s getting 
100% - no comment on that – but this is the 
real picture.  And to see the value of, um, uh, 
yeah, honest measurement, and you know a 
genuine concern to see the program improve 
in real terms rather than on paper. 
Implementation 
Capacity 
Refers to capacity of 
implementing 
organizations – could 
include technical 
skills, organizational 
skills, ability to be 
financially sustainable 
and function well 
enough to win grants 
…it is the inherent capacity – it is not about 
HIV knowledge – it’s about just how a good 
NGO functions.  In terms of membership, in 
terms of its rules and regulation and 
registration, you know, and it’s just normal 
performance of an organization.  So that is 
how they have been there to build capacity, 





Refers to significance 





We were like, naïve people with---oh, ok, let’s 
just go there and distribute a lot of condoms 
and—within 12 months realized that these sex 
workers and MSM don’t care about condoms 
or health – they care about violence.  And if 
you’re not able to solve violence for the, there 
is, you know, so we had to address that.  And 
slowly it became apparent that unless they are 
driving the interventions, you don’t see the 
results.   
Advocacy Refers to role of 
advocacy in sustaining 
program impact – 
could refer to 
advocacy to  make a 
change to program 
management or 
activities based on data 
or to  allocate 
resources differently   
…  Advocacy with the government, through the 
communities to ensure that whatever the 
voices of communities are heard by the 
government and also, if there need to be policy 
changes or need to be – you know going to be 
a shift in the program, which – community sees 
it as important for them, to be those voices are 








Learning Refers the importance 
to continue to try to 
improve program and 
learn better or more 
effective approaches 
So that way, I think, dialogue  with donors, 
and academics, and others outside, those 
who are directly involved in implementation 
is absolutely critical because this program 
will die the day they stop innovating.  And 
they stop thinking.  And they just keep doing 
the routinely, one after the other, same 
thing.   
 
 
Barriers of Sustainability 
Code Definition Illustrative Quote 
Unreliable 
leadership 
Refers to instances in 
which turnover or 
uncommitted 
leadership 
…especially in the higher level leadership.  So there 
is stability of leaders in Nagaland.  In Manipur, if I 
had to speak, Manipur actually, yes the government is 
also taking responsibility, no doubt about it, but then 
because of its own unique challenges, you know, 
unique system that they follow, there is a lot of uh, 
issues and concerns related to manpower.  Frequent 
change of project directors, frequent change of the 
commissioners, you know.  It really hampers the 
implementation of the program 
Misaligned 
priorities 
Refers to challenges 
relating to divergent 
priorities either 
between BMGF/SLP 





So let’s say we built a program focused on MARPS, 
and the government decided they wanted to work on a 
mixed population setting, or a general population 
setting, or  a completely different typology of MARPs, 
or a different group of, perhaps people who are at a 
secondary level of risk, like truckers or migrants or 
people like that.  And there is some sign that the 
government is starting to move towards those kinds of 
programs.  Then that’s a huge mismatch.  So at its 
highest level, transition means that there had to be 







cessation of some 
aspect of program 
because of 
differences in cost 
  The remote areas strategy may or may not get off the 
ground.  It may not be funded.  I’m not sure what they 
agreement has been reached on that because it does 
involve additional funding,…. I don’t know if that will 
be accepted by SACS really, because it costs more 









Refers to challenges 
relating to lack of 
capacity – either 
organizational or 
technical 
The NE context is slightly different than the rest of the 
India states.  We are a little behind in terms of 
development, in terms of capacity, in terms of so 
many things, you know? So …we actually started out 
with a lot of capacity-building – that’s why we are 
actually late in the first phase.  So our first phase was 
on intensive capacity building of the partners that we 
work with.  So um, they um, over the years, they have 
grown with us and we also have grown with them, so 
um, it, they have reached certain stage where they 
were able to deliver certain things – so those really 





Code Definition Illustrative Quote 
Paying for 
program 




resources for program 
The role of the state is in supporting and 
providing a budget of course so they can run the 






Refers to government role 
in supporting 
NGOs/CBOs and 
maintaining the quality of 
the program 
…it means, that they, um, have, uh, the technical 
capacity to run the programs, i.e., they 
understand what you know a targeted intervention 
is about, right?  Uh, and they have the capacity 
not only to run it but they have the capacity to 
continue to innovate and make improvements on 
it.  They have the management capacity to 
administer and run a program across the country, 







adopting practices shown 
effective under Avahan 
So I feel government ownership is actually 
accepting whatever it is that Avahan is giving.  
…Again, it’s not, ok, they have taken over from 
Avahan for one year, thereafter because a lack of 
resources, they could leave it.  But I think NACP-
4 that they are going to continue with all the sites 
with which Avahan was working, as well as in 
other states where Avahan was not working they 
want to scale-up also.  Learning from the Avahan 




Refers to government 
motivation and genuine 
commitment to program 
and its goals – applies to 
accepting responsibility 
for program outcomes, 
wanting to improve 
program, aligning with 
… I have a responsibility, I have an 
accountability.  I can understand what is 
going on, make mid-course corrections if I 
want.  I know what is good, what is not 









Refers to government’s 
role in ensuring services 
remain available to end-
users and being 
responsive to end-user 
input in program  
I feel that they are both important.  It is the state’s 
responsibility for our health, isn’t it?  For rights 
and health.  But on the other hand it is the 
individuals who need to realize they have a right 
to health and a right to other rights and human 
rights, isn’t it?  So it’s a combination of both 
really.  So the government ownership, definitely, 
they know that all of these things has to be there 
for them, but it’s not enforced by them.  
Facilitated or make sure that these things are 
available, the government has to work on, that 
will make them sustain. 
 
Community Ownership 
Code Definition Illustrative Quote 
Participating in 
program 
References to coming 




..it’s more like involving at a level where they 
influence the program and they are part of 
the program – they can reach out to you 
know, decision-making role at the table, and 
also advocate for changes that is required. 
Valuing program Refers to end-user 
motivations for 
engaging in the 
program and the extent 
to which they think 
HIV prevention is 
relevant to them 
Now the ownership part of it is kind of a 
thing – for many CBOs, although we 
organized them into community based 
organizations, the ownership has not yet 
come to the level that we would like them to.  
That means, this program is our program.  
We need to make sure that the communities 
are healthy...we don’t want communities to 
get HIV/AIDS.  We look at all the parameters 
– these are the programs for the people, by 
the people.  For us we need to do. 
Building 
organizational skills 
Refers to gaining skills 
to run a CBO 
I mean we focus on building up certain 
things, like strengthening crisis response, 
advocating for HIV resources, and talking to 
government to get them to give resources.  
We work to get both cash and in-kind 
resources, you know, so if not money then we 
help them maybe get rice or something in 
exchange for services.  We help them save 
money and get bank accounts.  We want 
communities to be able to form cooperatives, 










users teaching other 
individuals what they 
know 
We also work on mapping schemes and 
helping key populations within communities 
connect with each other.  Another thing we 
do is try to give them land so they have space 
to meet 
Advocating for rights Refers to community 
role in advocating, 
demanding their rights, 
expressing complaints 
to government about 
program quality 
…that 1000 population there, for example, 
they all need to take ownership, irrespective 
if the services given by the NGO or the 
Government, they have to go and demand for 
the – as owners – in my perspective. 
Building 
confidence/agency 
Refers to changes in 
the way end-users see 
themselves and the 
extent to which they 
are comfortable and 
able to address their 
own needs 
…I think these things that they have worked 
on has helped them you know with building 
their confidence, building their negotiation 
skills, not only with um their clients and 
partners but also with the larger society.  
Which is more important for them because 
it’s important that stigma comes down.  The 
community that we are working in, they have 
a high level of stigma. Today, they are like 









Refers to differences in the 
support for community-
oriented activities, 
includes changes in 
monitoring, changes in 
money allowed, changes 
in attention given to 
activities 
We also had a unit of community mobilization 
which, uh, the government had components of 
that but ours was much stronger and we put 
much more focus on that, so I don’t think that 
the government has the same focus on their 
programs of community mobilization.   
 
Priority of HIV 
interventions 
Refers to changes in 
emphasis on HIV, 
including changes in 
testing requirements, 
frequency of testing, iCTC 
performance 
In  the government program was a large push 
and tried to see that high risk women are tested 
for HIV so that they could help them by putting 
them on treatment if required, …So we added 
testing component to our program and started 
referring women who are positive to the 
government centers for ART.   
Delivery sites 
(place) 
Refers to changes in 
clinics- includes changes 
in NE where mobile clinic 
changes and referrals to 
government clinics in 
south – anything where 
location of drop-in center 
or clinic changes 
Uh, they started realizing that it was important 
for the government to um, see that the high risk 
groups, especially sex workers and MSMs, were 
referred to government facilities.  Uh so we 









Refers to changes in the 
experience of receiving 
services, including 
changes in “incentives,” 
changes in the tone of 
interactions with doctors, 
changes in who provides 
services, etc 
Their state clinics do not have designated 
doctors, they do not have designated ANMs, 
they are, um, they HIV clinics are run by the 
counselors….  So the whole clinical system has 
systems failures.  The stigma is still also there; 
discrimination is there.   
Overall cost of 
program 
Changes in the costing 
structure and overall cost 
of program 
We reduced the cost of our program, especially 
on the ground, the cost of our program, and we 
standardized the core components earlier if they 
were different for different partners, and we – 





Refers to changes in 
number of staff supported 
for management, amount 
paid to management 
…as the number of Tis has increased, the 
burden is up more.  For example, I used to 
handle some 80 Tis – that was 3-4 years back.  
Now, it’s 175 Tis – so it’s a big number.  And 
at the same time, the human resources should 
also be increased.  That’s what uh –the burden 




Refers to changes in 
staffing at TI level 
(counselors, M&E, PE) 
What you say is their allowance is only 
400 as per NACO guidelines.  They 
wanted the same thing for Avahan also.  
But for our people, outreach workers 
might make 2-3 times that, one is an 
administration block here.  So to travel 
one to the other is a lot of money and so 
400 is not sufficient….   
  
Monitoring Changes in indicators 
monitored, monitoring 
process  
.Some of the elements which were handling, 
which were monitored by the donors when they 
were part of the donor program, those 
indicators are not part of the government 
indicator there.  … For example let’s take 
community mobilization element.  CBO 
membership indicator.  CBO membership was 
part of [program name] monitoring system.  But 






Refers to changes in 
ability to use budget 
flexibility to pay for 
additional/different 
activities 
See since they had a lot of flexible budgets and 
flexibility, they have given the program and as 
for the requirement of the geography, the 
population, and uh, the kind of resources that 
they have available there.  But the government 
is completely fixed.  I mean everything is fixed 
there.  During the transition process also, we 
had a lot of difficulty negotiating with the TIs 
and then bringing them back to the mainstream 
and then supporting them in the alignment 
process 
Flexibility to do 
research/ pilots 
Refers to changes in 
ability to deviate from 
standard implementation 
norms and try out new 
approaches 
 So, there has been a lot of modifications that 
we’ve done basically because our people are, 
you know, could be up to 3 days walk from the 
DIC, or clinic, and they have been very 
successful and a lot of our thinking about what 
our responsibility is, is having, having I guess 
uh, along with the NGOs come up with these 
ideas and developed them, and worked hard to 
develop them and we don’t want to see them 
dropped because SACS are unwilling to have 
anything except the standard model… 
Investment in 
management 
Refers to changes in 
amount of time allocated 
to management, people 
dedicated to management 
position, overall 
investment in management 
The function the government often doesn’t fund, 
and often forgets to fund, and doesn’t pay 
enough attention to is the middle layer – the 
management layer.  And, uh, it’s always tough 
to pitch that to the government because it’s 
something they feel, if they do it, they do it 
themselves, and if they want to contract it in, 
they want to do it at rates that you can’t get 
good quality folks.   
 
Alignment Challenges 
Code Definition Illustrative Quote 
Resources Refers to differences 
between Avahan and 
NACP budgets, costings, 
staffing allowances  
…first round it was very tough because 
they had several other components 
which was not in our program.  They 
were paying more than what we could 
afford and so on and so forth.…  
Flexibility Refers to challenges in 
supporting variations 
from standard 
implementing norms that 
non-Avahan TIs follow 
See since they had a lot of flexible budgets and 
flexibility, they have given the program and as for 
the requirement of the geography, the population, 
and uh, the kind of resources that they have 








Refers to differences in 





…I don’t know how far it is feasible to the 
government or not.  But positioning a specialist at 
the [NGO] level or the government level who 
would handle that community mobilization aspect.  
As I told earlier this is one area where government 
is not very comfortable doing that.  They don’t 
have the resources, number one, and they don’t 
have skills also.  This is something different 
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